Sanctions have become a significant element in contemporary global politics, serving not only as a tool to pressure governments but also as a means to influence unfavorable regimes. In recent decades, their use has grown so pervasive that sanctions are now perceived as one of the key instruments in the foreign policy arsenal of major powers. Yet, as practice shows, the effectiveness of sanctions remains debatable. Not all Western politicians and experts view them as the ideal solution to conflicts. Many argue that sanctions often fail to achieve their stated objectives and can lead to unexpected, sometimes adverse, consequences. For instance, some experts believe that sanctions might actually bolster authoritarian regimes by providing a pretext for internal consolidation. Human rights organizations also frequently criticize sanctions for their humanitarian impact, noting that they often worsen the living conditions of ordinary citizens, who suffer from shortages, rising prices, and a lack of essential medicines.
This raises a question: if sanctions cause more harm than good or even strengthen authoritarian regimes, as seen in certain countries, are they truly justifiable? Could more effective diplomatic tools replace sanctions? This remains one of the key questions without a clear answer.
A History of Punishment
The history of sanctions spans several millennia. Even in ancient times, states used trade embargoes and restrictions to pressure their adversaries. One notable example is the Athenian “Megarian Decree” in the 5th century BCE, which banned trade with Megara, contributing to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.
In the Middle Ages, sanctions were often religious. The Catholic Church, for example, restricted trade with non-Christian countries to exert pressure on the “infidels.” During the age of exploration and colonial wars, trade embargoes became a central tool of economic pressure among great powers.
The 20th century saw the emergence of international organizations that began to systematize and formalize sanctions. The League of Nations, and later the United Nations (UN), used sanctions to influence states that violated international norms. For instance, the League’s sanctions against Italy in 1935 following its invasion of Ethiopia aimed to prevent further aggression, though they proved ineffective.
In the 1960s, the U.S. embargo on Cuba became one of the most prominent examples of sanctions. Imposed in 1962 after Fidel Castro’s rise to power and nationalization of American assets, the U.S. sought to isolate Cuba economically and politically, marking a Cold War symbol. Despite prolonged sanctions, the Cuban regime persisted, fueling debates on the efficacy of such measures in achieving political objectives. While the Obama administration attempted some relaxation in the early 21st century, most restrictions remain in force.
In the 21st century, sanctions evolved into a targeted tool against individuals and organizations, not just states. Sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Russia exemplify measures aimed at critical sectors like energy, finance, and defense, as well as the elites who make decisions.
Russia Under Sanctions: Causes and Consequences
Russia faced sanctions in 2014 following its annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The European Union, U.S., Canada, and other Western countries imposed restrictive measures on Russian banks, energy companies, and key political elites. These sanctions aimed to isolate Russia politically and economically on the global stage, pressuring it to reconsider its foreign policy ambitions and alter its course.
Although these sanctions have had noticeable impacts, they have not led to dramatic changes in Russian policy. Instead, Russia responded to Western pressure by strengthening its internal economic mechanisms and boosting cooperation with countries like China, India, and others that do not support the sanctions policy. These connections have helped Russia mitigate the effects of sanctions by finding alternative markets and partners.
In 2022, amid the full-scale conflict in Ukraine, sanctions intensified significantly. Western nations imposed new restrictions on high-tech exports, financial operations, and froze the assets of Russian oligarchs and state-owned companies abroad. This has had severe domestic economic consequences, including price increases, capital outflow, and supply chain disruptions, especially in high-tech sectors.
Is There Just Cause for Discontent?
Despite Russia’s ongoing grievances about sanctions, it actively uses them as a foreign policy tool whenever convenient. This goes beyond retaliatory measures against countries that sanctioned Russia, which might be understandable. For instance, in response to Western sanctions, Moscow has already banned food imports from the EU, U.S., and other nations, severely impacting Europe’s agricultural sector.
Yet, Russia frequently imposes short-term sanctions on post-Soviet states that disagree with its political course. Remarkably, many of these countries are part of various integration alliances with Russia, which does not stop Moscow from using economic threats to exert pressure.
There are numerous examples. When CIS countries express dissatisfaction with Russian policy, “bacteria” are soon discovered in their products—whether from Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Central Asian countries. In 2006, for instance, Russia banned Georgian wine and mineral water imports after tensions with Georgia escalated. A recent example involves Kazakhstan: in 2024, Russia banned Kazakh agricultural products following Astana’s refusal to join BRICS. These cases illustrate that Russia does not hesitate to use economic pressure on its neighbors and partners, despite its rhetoric on the “unfairness” of Western sanctions.
Russia’s migration policy is another form of sanctions, wielded as a lever to pressure neighboring states. Similar to its approach with agricultural products, Russia acts impulsively and harshly in migration matters. One recent example was tightening migration policy following a terrorist attack in “Crocus City” committed by individuals from Tajikistan. This practice dates back to the era of Mikheil Saakashvili, when Russia deported Georgian citizens. Migrants from Azerbaijan also often bore the brunt of such policies. Today, members of the CSTO, like Armenia and Tajikistan, are similarly affected, causing a sense of alienation in these countries. It is well known that Moscow has negative attitudes toward migrants, especially those with non-Slavic appearances, further intensifying tensions.
Labor migration restrictions bring new challenges to Russia itself. Amid sanctions, a falling ruble, and the effects of several mobilization waves, the country faces a labor shortage. Russia has become less attractive to migrant workers, and its popularity among potential “guest workers” is plummeting. Additionally, sending migrants to the Ukrainian front raises serious concerns in Bishkek, Dushanbe, and other capitals of countries whose citizens work in Russia.
The question arises: can Russia reasonably complain about the sanctions imposed on it for its actions on the international stage if it actively applies sanctions and migration measures against other countries? These contradictions between foreign policy ambitions and internal restrictions create a double standard. Furthermore, today’s issues stemming from the “anti-immigration campaign” could lead to a labor shortage previously offset by migrants. If Russia continues tightening measures while its economy remains under sanctions, the situation will only worsen—doesn’t this seem like shooting itself in the foot?
