Against the backdrop of growing instability in the global arena, the South Caucasus has once again drawn the attention of major foreign policy actors. At the center of the current regional agenda is the potential signing of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia — a prospect that, for the first time in years, appears genuinely realistic. While formal negotiations have been ongoing for several years, recent developments suggest a possible breakthrough in the conflict resolution process.
One of the key indicators pointing in this direction was a recent statement by U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio, made in the context of a broader report on the foreign policy achievements of the Trump administration. Among other diplomatic successes, Rubio specifically referenced progress toward a peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan. It is worth noting that such rhetoric comes from a representative of an administration that has generally shown limited interest in the South Caucasus — particularly when compared to the more active approach of the Biden administration.
The current U.S. strategy favors indirect involvement, primarily through its key regional ally, Türkiye. In this context, frequent communication between American and Turkish diplomats, as well as reports of behind-the-scenes discussions on the terms of the agreement, appear highly significant. Of particular note is the meeting between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, scheduled for July 10 in Abu Dhabi. The fact that it was announced less than 24 hours in advance suggests a high degree of confidentiality and sensitivity surrounding the negotiation process.
Beyond political reconciliation, economic and logistical considerations remain central to the dialogue — most notably the proposed Zangezur Corridor. Competing external visions are gradually forming around this project. According to various sources, there are discussions of international oversight over the transport route, potentially involving a private operator linked to the American side. This model echoes earlier EU proposals and reflects Washington’s interest in institutionalizing its presence within the South Caucasus infrastructure network.
In contrast, Russia appears increasingly sidelined from the negotiation process. The Kremlin, which has traditionally claimed the role of primary mediator in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, is being excluded from the key formats. Public statements from Russian diplomats are becoming increasingly critical, underscoring Moscow’s position that a lasting peace is only possible within the framework of the 2020–2022 trilateral agreements, signed with its direct involvement. Yet it was precisely those agreements that served more to freeze the conflict than to resolve it — preserving Russia’s geopolitical foothold in the region without producing a lasting settlement.
Domestic political factors also play a non-negligible role. In Armenia, internal debates continue over the need to amend the national constitution — a precondition repeatedly emphasized by Baku. At the same time, Washington’s willingness to publicly express confidence in the peace process may suggest that some level of preliminary understanding has already been reached on the more contentious issues.
Additional elements further complicate the diplomatic landscape. Increasing pressure on the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, the growing activity of pro-Russian factions within Armenian society, and Moscow’s attempts to maintain informational control in the region all signal that the Kremlin views the current diplomatic momentum as a direct challenge to its strategic interests. This regional realignment is taking place at a time when Russia’s international position is weakened, and its capacity to shape regional dynamics is visibly diminishing.
Against this backdrop, the central question becomes whether sufficient international guarantees will be provided to ensure the implementation of any agreements reached. Without such guarantees, even the formal signing of a treaty could prove insufficient. Should credible assurances be offered — primarily by the U.S. and Türkiye — the South Caucasus may emerge as a case study of successful, albeit complex, multilateral conflict resolution driven largely by informal mechanisms of influence.
How the Abu Dhabi meeting concludes — and with what positions the two leaders return — is a question of considerable significance amid growing anticipation and cautious optimism from both international and regional observers. The signing of a peace agreement, or at the very least, the adoption of a clear roadmap for its finalization, would mark a key indicator of the maturity of bilateral dialogue and the capacity of both parties to operate beyond traditional mediation structures. It is increasingly evident that both Baku and Yerevan are interested in pursuing negotiations within a new, more autonomous diplomatic framework. In this regard, Abu Dhabi may become either the starting point of a new architecture for regional security — or yet another missed opportunity, with potentially serious consequences for the long-term stability of the South Caucasus.
