The escalation between Russia and Azerbaijan, which began with the downing of an AZAL passenger flight in December 2024 – when the plane was shot down over Grozny and crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan- reached a critical point on June 27, 2025, following mass detentions and the deaths of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg. These events have become part of a series of dramatic developments that reflect not only the deterioration of bilateral relations, but also a profound transformation of the entire regional architecture in the South Caucasus. Amid growing discontent with Moscow’s actions in Armenia, Russia has, for the first time since the post-Soviet era, found itself without stable influence in either Baku or Yerevan. In other words, it has simultaneously lost leverage in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Beating the Diaspora
Even if the detentions and killings of Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg do not reflect a strategic directive from the Kremlin — as some argue in an attempt to downplay the crisis – and are instead the result of the internal logic of local security forces and isolated conflicts (a typical Russian practice of “local overreach”), the consequences of this “overreach” have already taken on a strategic dimension.
What stood out -and perhaps came as a surprise to many- was the firm and uncompromising response from Baku to the killings in Yekaterinburg. The very fact that Azerbaijan allowed itself to adopt such a direct and sharp tone toward Moscow signals a qualitative shift in the regional balance of power. For the Kremlin, this is psychologically difficult — particularly amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, domestic pressure, and international isolation.
In response, the Russian side revived its usual rhetoric about “third forces” allegedly seeking to drive a wedge between the two countries. However, neither the United States, the European Union, nor China had any involvement in the actions of the police in Yekaterinburg. This is a rhetorical tactic aimed at domestic audiences and disconnected from reality. In fact, in unofficial contacts between the intelligence and government circles of both countries, the issue of “third forces” is not even raised.
If Sanctions Come Tomorrow
Discussions are intensifying around the possibility of Russia exerting various forms of pressure on Azerbaijan — from restricting exports and imposing administrative measures on migrants to a demonstrative cooling of trade relations. However, such steps do not convey strength; rather, they appear as weak and poorly calculated political gestures. Economic blackmail will not work against Azerbaijan, and pressure on the diaspora will only deepen the crisis. Baku has already demonstrated its readiness to respond firmly and defend its national interests.
Since the conversation turns to economics, let us look at the numbers. The total volume of economic interaction between the two countries- including remittances from the diaspora (around $500 million), agricultural exports ($200 million), and oil trading ($150 million) — amounts to approximately $850 million annually. For Azerbaijan, this is about 1.2% of GDP — significant, but far from critical. Russia’s share as a destination for Azerbaijani labor migrants has already declined from 63% to 46%. Azerbaijan’s primary trading partners today are the European Union, Türkiye, and countries of the Middle East. Trade with Italy alone exceeds trade with Russia by a factor of 2.5, and with Georgia by a factor of four.
Russia, too, will feel the consequences of a rupture – and at all levels. Its southern regions, especially Astrakhan and Dagestan, are set to lose a stable importer of grain, fuel, metals, and machinery. The disruption of logistical chains along the North–South Corridor renders infrastructure investments ineffective: Azerbaijan’s participation in the project was not merely desirable but foundational. Without Baku, the route loses both economic viability and political meaning.
Russia’s consumer market is also vulnerable. Up to 35% of fresh tomatoes during the winter-spring season used to come from Azerbaijan. Potential substitution from Türkiye, Iran, or China will not ensure the same volume, reliability, or price stability. Risks of shortages and price hikes are already apparent.
Another vulnerable segment is the labor market. Azerbaijanis are officially employed in construction, logistics, retail, housing services, and other sectors long suffering from workforce shortages. Pressure on migrants or mass deportations would reduce tax revenues, cause disruptions in essential services, and escalate social tensions — especially in Russia’s largest cities.
What Comes Next?
In the short term, tensions between the two countries could be eased if those responsible for the torture and murder of the Safarov brothers are identified and held accountable. The grim precedent of the “Novosibirsk case” — in which a police officer shot and killed 19-year-old Vekil Abdullayev without facing any consequences — remains fresh in memory. Without a transparent and honest investigation, restoring trust between Baku and Moscow will be impossible.
One particularly painful and unresolved episode is the downing of the AZAL passenger jet by Russian air defenses. Moscow’s attempts to cover up the incident — citing implausible theories such as a bird strike or an “onboard gas explosion” — were seen in Azerbaijan as a deliberate insult. This perception was only deepened by the anti-Azerbaijani media campaign in Russian outlets and social networks, which began after the plane was shot down and Baku responded. That campaign continues to fuel xenophobic sentiment and deepen the public perception crisis within Russian society.
One thing is certain: Azerbaijan is not interested in escalation. Baku’s foreign policy has always been grounded in pragmatism, respect for sovereignty, and a commitment to mutually beneficial cooperation. However, building equal, mutually respectful partnerships requires political will from both sides. A single investigation in Yekaterinburg is not enough if the broader Russian public discourse remains steeped in arrogance, xenophobia, and aggression.
In the long term, if Moscow truly seeks stable and predictable relations with Azerbaijan, it must abandon its imperial tone and move toward a model of respectful, equal engagement. This will require not cosmetic adjustments but systemic change — a shift from paternalistic foreign policy thinking to partnership based on mutual interests and adherence to international norms.
Perhaps most importantly: the current crisis in relations will eventually come to an end — but its consequences will endure. Russia’s former authority, it seems, is already lost. Even among segments of Azerbaijani society that had long held onto illusions about Moscow, a rapid and likely irreversible awakening is now underway. And from the standpoint of Azerbaijan’s national interests, this may well be for the better: illusions in international politics are always dangerous.
