Iran’s use of false narratives is a long-standing instrument in the ideological sphere. While serving primarily tactical purposes, there are ongoing attempts to transform it into a strategic tool.
The emphasis placed by the Iranian establishment on this approach in its policy toward Azerbaijan suggests that Tehran challenges established international norms. It also indicates that the export of the Islamic Revolution remains a central element of Iran’s foreign policy.
In this context, the remarks of Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader and former foreign minister, are significant. Commenting on the reception of Israeli rabbis in Baku—an event unrelated to Iran or to bilateral relations—he described it as “an unprecedented violation, anti-Islamic and offensive to the dignity of Shiites worldwide,” adding that “the people of Azerbaijan will undoubtedly oppose such a move.”
Such statements raise important questions. If a violation is being alleged, to which rules or codes does this refer? Why should a religious meeting be considered “anti-Islamic”? And on what grounds can it be assumed that the Azerbaijani people oppose an event that aligns with the country’s long-standing tradition of tolerance?
Azerbaijan regularly hosts international events devoted to intercultural and interreligious dialogue, many of them under the auspices of the United Nations. These initiatives, supported by both religious and secular institutions, underscore Baku’s role in promoting trust and dialogue on the international stage. Against this backdrop, Velayati’s interpretation appears detached from the actual trajectory of Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign policy.
By framing developments in a neighboring state through a clerical lens, the Iranian adviser advances a narrative that risks undermining Azerbaijan’s internal stability and complicating its relations with other Muslim-majority countries. His suggestion that the event in Baku was linked to the expansion of the Abraham Accords to Azerbaijan and Central Asia illustrates this trend. Yet such decisions rest exclusively with sovereign governments, not with Tehran.
Velayati also argued that after the Russo-Iranian wars of 1826–1828, the Azerbaijani people sought to “return” to Iran. Historical evidence contradicts this claim. The Azerbaijani nation pursued self-determination and sovereignty, culminating in the establishment of the republic despite significant obstacles. Such reinterpretations distort historical reality and undermine the legitimacy of Azerbaijan’s independent development.
This episode highlights a recurring pattern in Iran–Azerbaijan relations. Periods of progress toward normalization are often followed by the re-emergence of destabilizing narratives. This reflects structural contradictions within Iran’s political system, where mutually inconsistent messages can originate from the same center of authority.
It is also noteworthy that such rhetoric diverges from Iran’s own diplomatic legacy. In 1998, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution proposed by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, designating 2001 as the Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations. The initiative was widely welcomed as a constructive contribution to global discourse. Today, however, that very concept has been sidelined within Iran, replaced by more confrontational narratives.
Thus, the use of false narratives, exemplified by Velayati’s remarks, remains a feature of Iran’s policy toward Azerbaijan. By distorting historical realities and questioning the sovereignty of neighboring states, such interventions undermine regional trust and contradict Iran’s earlier efforts to present itself as a proponent of dialogue among civilizations.
