The growing wave of protest activity in Iran once again raises the question of how internal turbulence in the country may affect the wider region. For neighboring states, including Azerbaijan, the key issue is not so much the eventual outcome of street protests as the risk of prolonged instability, which could turn Iran into a persistent source of economic, logistical, and security challenges.
The West and the United States have traditionally viewed Iran not as an independent center of technological and military-industrial development, but rather as a potential consumer and participant in controlled markets—along the lines of Saudi Arabia or Qatar, which lack a developed domestic defense industry. Iran, by contrast, has spent decades building a different model, emphasizing strategic autonomy, including in weapons production and nuclear technologies. The scale of protest sentiment largely depends on how successfully Iranian authorities manage economic pressures. At the same time, a significant portion of Iranian society does not see foreign intervention as an acceptable scenario, given the still vivid memory of what unfolded in Iraq.
Another important factor is the participation of Iran’s Turkic population in the protests. Azerbaijani Turks have historically played a notable role in the country’s socio-political life, yet for them the consequences of a possible change of power are of fundamental importance. One of the symbolic figures of the opposition camp—the heir to the Pahlavi dynasty—is viewed with caution in this community, given the historical experience of the suppression of the South Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the legacy of rigid Persian nationalist policies. This is precisely why current protests are directed primarily toward socio-economic demands rather than a radical dismantling of the political system.
Statements by Donald Trump suggesting possible US intervention in the event of harsh crackdowns on protesters are not widely perceived in the region as a factor capable of fundamentally altering the situation. Iran is not Venezuela, and the existing system of power is far more resilient. Even a hypothetical regime change would not automatically resolve key issues, including the question of self-determination for Azerbaijani Turks, as both regional and global actors would act to constrain such outcomes. The appointment of Ali Khamenei after Ruhollah Khomeini largely consolidated a balance among internal power centers and effectively froze the most sensitive issues.
Any serious political changes in Iran would inevitably affect the energy sector. The question of Iranian oil access to global markets under a new political configuration could be reformatted, but would in any case remain under external oversight. Regional political dialogue might also shift: relations with Israel could be reconsidered, Iran–Turkey ties adjusted, and the Kurdish factor could develop along new lines. As for the rights of Azerbaijanis in Iran—language, education, and cultural freedoms—their prospects would depend directly on the composition, intentions, and capacity of any future ruling elites.
For Azerbaijan, stability along its borders remains the overriding priority. Chaos in Iran carries the risk of refugee flows, including among ethnic kin, the possibility of a civil conflict along a Libyan-type scenario, or the spillover of extremist armed groups. Under such conditions, Baku has an objective interest in predictability, even if relations with Tehran remain complex.
A change of power in Iran would also have implications for Russia. For Moscow, Iran is an important channel for bypassing sanctions and a key partner in the military sphere, including arms supplies. A regime shift could alter the military balance in the Caspian region, a development that Russia would hardly welcome.
The Armenian dimension also deserves particular attention. Even if a future Iranian regime were secular in nature, the strategic contours of Iran–Armenia relations would likely remain intact. Armenia continues to serve as an important corridor for energy and transport links, and any changes in these ties could indirectly affect Azerbaijani–Armenian dynamics, including prospects for the Zangezur Corridor and other regional routes.
In a broader sense, Iran’s neighbors are less concerned with the question of “who wins in the streets” than with the risk that the country could enter a prolonged phase of turbulence. Even without a change of power, protests undermine the economy, currency stability, logistics, and security architecture. This immediately affects energy markets through rising risk premiums, trade through slower transport and tighter controls, and migration through gradual, “silent” population outflows.
The most likely scenario appears to be one of protracted instability, marked by periodic surges of protest activity, restrictive measures, and sharp economic fluctuations. In such conditions, Azerbaijan and other regional states are likely to act pragmatically: strengthening monitoring, keeping border and infrastructure systems on alert, and avoiding steps that could be interpreted as interference. For Baku, the central task remains the protection of national interests in an environment where an unstable Iran could become a constant source of pressure across the entire South Caucasus.
