The first anniversary of the catastrophe involving an AZAL aircraft shot down by a Russian air defense system while approaching Grozny marked more than a day of remembrance. It delineated a threshold beyond which an institutional crisis of responsibility in the post-Soviet space has become increasingly evident. The reactions of the parties involved, the course of the investigation, and public statements by officials point not so much to a dispute over facts as to a divergence in the understanding of the fundamental principles of international conduct, trust, and responsibility.
The investigation into the tragedy is ongoing under Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention, with the participation of ICAO and representatives of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Brazil, and Russia. The interim report published by Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport on the anniversary of the crash leaves several technical questions unresolved but records a number of key findings of fundamental importance. The document notes the absence of damage to the oxygen cylinders, thereby ruling out an internal explosion, and confirms the presence of foreign metallic fragments on board associated with a weapons system. The shared position of experts converges on the principal conclusion that the aircraft lost control and crashed as a result of external impact rather than technical failure.
Within the geographic and operational context of the incident, this conclusion leaves little room for alternative interpretations. At the time of the incident, no air defense systems other than Russian ones were operating in the vicinity of Grozny. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed at a meeting in Dushanbe that the aircraft had been struck by Russian air defense forces. Thus, the fundamental question regarding the nature of the incident has, at this stage, received a definitive answer.
The core problem, however, lies not in the establishment of facts but in the response to them. Statements made by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the first anniversary of the tragedy revealed an attempt to shift the emphasis. While describing the crash as a “shared tragedy,” the Russian side simultaneously identified attacks by drones of the “Kyiv regime” on Russia’s civilian infrastructure as the “root cause.” Such framing effectively diverts attention away from the institutional failure—namely, the use of air defense against a civilian aircraft and the failure to close the airspace—and toward external circumstances that neither negate nor diminish responsibility for the decisions taken.
From the standpoint of international aviation and political practice, this logic is untenable. Regardless of the nature of perceived threats, when air defense systems and electronic warfare measures are in operation, the airspace must be immediately closed to civilian aviation. This is a basic safety standard, and its violation constituted the key factor behind the tragedy. Neither the existence of potential attacks nor a complex operational environment absolves a state of its obligation to ensure the safety of civilian flights.
In the aftermath of the catastrophe, the Russian side publicly outlined a course of action consistent with international norms: conducting an investigation, acknowledging responsibility, issuing an apology, providing compensation to the victims, and holding those responsible accountable. Yet nearly two and a half months after the official acknowledgment of air defense involvement, none of these elements has been fully implemented. Investigative procedures have been delayed, compensation mechanisms have not been launched, and specific responsible individuals have not been identified. A systemic gap has thus emerged between declared principles and their practical execution, inevitably undermining trust.
It is within this context that the absence of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev from the informal CIS summit should be understood. This was not an act of emotional diplomacy or demonstrative pressure, but a rational institutional signal. The effective functioning of multilateral formats becomes problematic when a fundamental crisis in bilateral relations remains unresolved. Political institutions cannot operate sustainably on top of unfinished tragedies.
It is essential to emphasize that the issue does not lie with the CIS as a structure. Azerbaijan has consistently demonstrated its readiness for active and pragmatic participation in this format, including at the Dushanbe summit, and has built stable relations with Central Asian states, Belarus, and Armenia. These tracks are developing precisely because they are grounded in clear rules of engagement and mutual responsibility. Against this backdrop, the Russian direction has become an exception due to the discrepancy between commitments and actions.
Baku’s position in the current situation remains logical and consistent. Azerbaijan is neither abandoning dialogue nor dismantling existing frameworks of cooperation. Instead, it proposes a clear institutional fork: either the crisis is resolved in line with international practice and declared obligations, or the country will continue to defend its position through international legal mechanisms. This is not an ultimatum or an attempt at pressure, but adherence to the logic of the contemporary political order.
The AZAL aircraft catastrophe has thus become a test not only for safety systems but also for the institutional maturity of the post-Soviet space. To date, this test remains unfinished. Political order does not tolerate “frozen tragedies” or rhetorical substitutions of responsibility with references to external threats. Until the situation is conclusively resolved, the issue extends beyond a single aviation disaster and speaks to the broader capacity of states to build relations on the basis of rules rather than interpretations, making this case an indicator of the overall condition of the region’s political architecture.
