Starting August 1, Azerbaijan is set to begin deliveries of natural gas to Syria. This development became possible following the lifting of U.S. restrictions on the export of energy resources to a country that has endured years of armed conflict and a severe energy crisis. The gas will be transported via Turkish territory. In addition to direct exports, the agreement also includes elements of Azerbaijani involvement in the restoration of Syria’s energy infrastructure.
The deal is seen as a significant step in expanding Azerbaijan’s energy presence in the Middle East. It also demonstrates Baku’s ability to identify new export routes and access previously unreachable markets.
Currently, Azerbaijani natural gas is exported to dozens of countries, including various European and Balkan states. The expansion of export geography is viewed not only as an economic opportunity but also as a tool of foreign policy diversification. Exporting to eastern and strategically prioritized destinations helps strengthen Azerbaijan’s regional influence while reducing dependence on traditional markets.
Syria, which remains in a slow and fragile process of recovery, faces an urgent need for stable electricity sources. Prior to the outbreak of war in 2011, the country produced around 50 billion kWh of electricity annually. By 2024, that figure had dropped to 15 billion kWh—and likely continues to decline. In this context, Azerbaijani gas takes on critical importance for Syria’s energy security.
At the same time, the nature of the agreement appears to be more strategic and political than commercial. Given the ongoing instability in Syria, limited financial resources, and the vulnerability of infrastructure projects, the direct economic benefit for Baku remains uncertain. The gas is likely being exported at reduced rates—similar to the preferential terms applied to some neighboring countries. This raises questions about the viability of offering discounts to high-risk markets, especially when compared to Azerbaijan’s commercial terms with countries in Southern and Southeastern Europe, where market-based pricing is standard.
The project’s logistical framework is also of interest. Azerbaijan is not directly involved in transporting the gas within Syrian territory. Deliveries are made to the Georgia–Türkiye border, where the gas is transferred to the Turkish side. Further transport falls under the responsibility of other participants in the supply chain. While this reduces security risks along the final leg of the route, it also highlights Azerbaijan’s limited role in the infrastructure component of the agreement.
Equally important is the political context. Given that the supply initiative is being implemented with Türkiye’s support, it represents a new model of energy cooperation in which Azerbaijan acts not as an autonomous player but as part of a broader regional framework. This limits Baku’s independent political influence within the project but allows it to remain flexible and avoid direct entanglement in Syria’s internal affairs.
In summary, gas deliveries to Syria open both economic opportunities and diplomatic challenges for Azerbaijan. The success of this initiative will depend on the country’s ability to adapt to unstable conditions, ensure the security and reliability of energy supplies, and maintain a balance between commercial interests and political neutrality in a highly sensitive regional environment.
