In recent months, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have deteriorated noticeably, despite a substantial body of bilateral agreements and long-standing cultural, economic, and humanitarian ties. More than two million ethnic Azerbaijanis reside in Russia, while Azerbaijan itself maintains a significant Russian-language educational and cultural presence. Yet these factors of proximity increasingly coexist with political mistrust and rhetorical confrontation.
The legal framework for cooperation appears solid: more than 170 agreements have been signed, including around 50 in the economic sphere. Among the foundational documents are the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Safety and the 2022 Declaration on Allied Interaction, signed by Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin. The latter has become a key reference point: it enshrines commitments to non-interference in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and consultations in the event of security threats. Moreover, the Declaration underscores the allied nature of relations and the need to “refrain from any actions damaging the strategic partnership.”
Nevertheless, the political climate has shifted. Azerbaijan’s consolidation after its victory in the Second Karabakh War and its increasingly independent foreign policy have been perceived in Moscow—particularly within the State Duma—as a challenge to Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Parliamentary statements targeting the Azerbaijani diaspora illustrate this trend: figures such as Sergey Mironov (A Just Russia—For Truth) and Konstantin Zatulin (CIS Affairs Committee) have portrayed the activities of Azerbaijani communities and associated enterprises (Sadovod, Food City) as national security risks. This reflects a growing tendency toward the securitization of migration and diaspora policy.
This rhetoric coincided with a sensitive episode—the downing of an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft in Russian airspace. Despite Moscow’s formal apology, its refusal to provide compensation or punish those responsible heightened feelings of vulnerability and distrust in Baku.
The broader context shows Russia struggling to adapt to a new multipolarity in the post-Soviet space. While Armenia’s distancing from Moscow has been tolerated, Azerbaijan’s and Uzbekistan’s moves—such as engagement with the European Union—have triggered sharper reactions. A telling example was the criticism of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev after he praised Azerbaijan’s strategic role and announced an expanded partnership with the EU. Russian legislators dismissed these steps as “temporary” and driven by “Western temptations.”
This rhetoric reflects several important dynamics. First, the securitization of the Azerbaijani diaspora has become a form of political signaling, aligning migration issues with broader disputes in foreign policy and effectively using diaspora communities as a lever of pressure. Second, trust between Moscow and Baku continues to erode: although the 2022 Declaration reaffirmed allied commitments, the language emerging from the State Duma undermines Russia’s credibility as a consistent and reliable partner. Finally, Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asia—most visibly through its energy cooperation with Uzbekistan—is interpreted in Moscow not as a chance for shared development but as a sign of strategic competition and a potential displacement of Russian influence.
At stake is not only the trajectory of Russian-Azerbaijani relations but also Moscow’s ability to adapt to the new order in Eurasia. Attacks on the leaders of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan—states pursuing multi-vector policies and strengthening regional cooperation—highlight the contradiction between the norms of the allied Declaration and the reality of Russian political discourse.
From a policy standpoint, the risk lies in normalizing ethnically charged rhetoric within Russia itself. As one of the world’s most multiethnic states, Russia undermines its own social cohesion when diaspora communities are collectively portrayed as security threats. Reciprocal measures by Baku or Tashkent cannot be ruled out.
Ultimately, the 2022 Declaration sets clear normative guidelines: respect for sovereignty, equality, and allied partnership. Yet the gap between this document and political practice is becoming increasingly evident. Unless Moscow aligns its strategic interests with the sovereign choices of its neighbors, its influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia will diminish—not through direct confrontation, but through the gradual diversification of partnerships by states once assumed to be “reliable allies.”
