Following the signing of the Washington agreements, which envisage the transfer of the Armenian section of the Zangezur corridor under long-term lease to an American operator, debates about Armenia’s readiness to fulfill its commitments remain highly relevant. Legally, Yerevan has pledged to guarantee transit from Azerbaijan’s western regions to Nakhchivan, yet the agreement itself underscores the framework of Armenian sovereignty and national legislation, leaving room for bureaucratic interpretations and potential implementation delays.
For Armenia’s leadership, unblocking communications is seen as a critical condition for overcoming transport isolation and attracting Western investment, which could offset domestic costs. U.S. involvement in managing the route provides an additional political shield: the agreement can be presented not as a concession to Baku but as a strategic project under international protection, thereby strengthening the government’s position against domestic opposition. Failure to implement the commitments would deal a serious blow to relations with Washington and Brussels, particularly in the context of deteriorating ties with Moscow.
Nevertheless, significant risks persist. Armenia’s domestic political environment remains fragile, and the opposition perceives any form of transit arrangement as a threat to statehood, potentially fueling protest mobilization. External actors also exert pressure: Iran views the project as limiting its own transit options and as a strategic threat, while Russia, having lost its role as a key mediator, seeks to slow the process through diplomatic channels and influence over Armenian society.
The likelihood that Armenia will formally ensure transit remains high, given the political and economic costs of derailing the agreements. In practice, however, delays, bureaucratic obstacles, and periodic crises are possible, reflecting both internal resistance and external pressure. The full implementation of TRIPP will only be feasible if the United States and the European Union assume the role of guarantors, providing Yerevan with economic dividends and political support to offset domestic and external costs. Otherwise, the corridor risks stalling and becoming a symbol of an unfinished process.
For Azerbaijan, TRIPP represents an opportunity to consolidate its connection with Türkiye, reduce reliance on Iranian routes, and strengthen its position as a key transit hub along the Caspian–Europe axis. For Armenia, it offers both the prospect of breaking isolation and attracting investment, and the risk of domestic political turmoil. For Türkiye, it reinforces the Ankara–Baku axis and enhances its role in Eurasian logistics. For Iran and Russia, the project constitutes a challenge that compels them to seek countermeasures.
Thus, TRIPP is gradually emerging as one of the central elements of the new geopolitical configuration in the South Caucasus. Its success will depend on the ability of the parties to secure legal frameworks, synchronize infrastructure, and maintain a balance of interests under consistent international support.
