Implementation of Language Policy and the Revision of Russian-Language Education in Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan’s continued state-funded support for Russian-language education, a legacy of the Soviet era, is increasingly misaligned with national interests. Amid declining academic performance, limited reciprocity from Russia, and shifting global language priorities, a strategic policy realignment is needed—favoring Azerbaijani and global languages while preserving Russian as a foreign-language option.

Jamal Ali
Jamal Ali
Depicting Saint Basil’s Cathedral and the Monument to Minin and Pozharsky in Moscow — freely licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0, credit: Olga Kuzmina / Center on Global Interests.

According to constitutional provisions, the Azerbaijani language is the official language of the country and is used for official documentation, administrative processes, and instruction in state institutions. In this context, the continued existence of Russian-language schools, inherited from the Soviet era, requires critical reassessment. As an independent state, Azerbaijan’s education and language policies can no longer adhere to post-imperial paradigms and must instead align with national interests and contemporary challenges.

Historically, the Russian language in the Soviet Union was regarded as a tool of integration, and Russian-language education was associated with prestige. However, global realities have shifted. In today’s world, proficiency in globally relevant languages—primarily English—is in much higher demand. Russian no longer holds its former status and should be treated on par with other foreign languages within the education system.

Nevertheless, 17 schools in Azerbaijan still operate exclusively in Russian, and over 300 schools have Russian-language sectors. As of 2025, approximately 100,000 students—representing 6.18% of the total student population—are educated in Russian. Notably, the vast majority of these students are ethnic Azerbaijanis, not members of the Russian diaspora, which numbers around 71,000 people.

State funding for Russian-language education raises questions of fairness and efficiency. Of the total education budget of 4.94 billion manats, roughly 400 million manats are allocated annually to support Russian schools and departments. At the same time, education in other foreign languages such as English or French is offered only on a paid basis. This creates an asymmetry in access and budgetary allocation.

The logic of state policy implies that priority should be given to financing education in the national language. In this light, maintaining Russian-language schools at public expense appears unjustified. Retaining Russian as a foreign language within the curriculum would ensure a balanced approach that also aligns with constitutional norms.

Beyond financial and organizational considerations, academic performance is a crucial metric. Analysis of graduation and university entrance exam results shows that students in Russian-language schools consistently score lower than those in the Azerbaijani-language sector. Among students who gain admission to top universities with high scores, graduates from Russian schools constitute only a small fraction. Furthermore, enrollment shortfalls are common in university programs designed for Russian-sector graduates.

These trends point to the inefficiency of maintaining a separate Russian-language segment. Moreover, many graduates educated in Russian are poorly equipped for the modern labor market, casting further doubt on the viability of continuing this format.

A shortage of qualified teaching staff compounds the issue. Russian-language schools increasingly lack competent educators, as the pipeline for their preparation has weakened in recent years. The teaching workforce, once supplemented by specialists from outside the country, has all but disappeared, and the remaining human resources often do not meet modern standards.

A particularly concerning aspect is the ideological content of educational materials. Many textbooks—especially those for Russian language and literature—are either imported from Russia or only minimally adapted. The teaching guides and tests in use frequently promote a cultural-linguistic environment that conflicts with Azerbaijan’s national identity and the concept of educational sovereignty. This poses a risk to the development of students’ national consciousness and language affiliation.

The experience of other post-Soviet states demonstrates the pragmatism of departing from outdated language models. Since the early 1990s, countries such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states have significantly reduced or completely phased out Russian-language education. These efforts were aimed at strengthening national languages and educational systems.

A special focus should also be placed on the issue of bilateral balance. While Azerbaijan maintains hundreds of Russian-language schools, there are no schools in Russia that provide education in Azerbaijani. Even in regions with concentrated Azerbaijani populations, such as Dagestan, the Azerbaijani language is not institutionally integrated into the education system. This reflects a lack of reciprocity and entrenches inequality in the humanitarian sphere.

In light of these considerations, it becomes clear that the current model of Russian-language education in Azerbaijan no longer meets strategic priorities, educational standards, or principles of national security. A policy shift is urgently needed toward a more balanced, pragmatic, and sovereign approach.

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