In the twenty-first century, the geopolitical weight of states is increasingly determined not only by the size of their territory, population, or natural resources, but also by their ability to participate in the management of transport, energy, and trade flows. Amid the fragmentation of the global economy, communications, logistics, and infrastructure connectivity are becoming independent sources of influence.
Recent years have clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the global transport system. The incident involving the Ever Given container ship in the Suez Canal, the shipping crisis in the Red Sea, rising risks around the Strait of Hormuz, the war in Ukraine, and the breakdown of previous economic ties between Russia and Europe have accelerated the revision of Eurasia’s transport map. Some routes have begun to be seen as less sustainable, while others have gained strategic importance.
Against this background, the role of so-called node states has grown significantly — countries located at the intersection of key transport, energy, and trade routes. This trend has become especially visible around the Middle Corridor, which links China, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and Europe.
In this context, Azerbaijan’s experience is of particular interest. In a relatively short historical period, the country has moved from having limited transport capabilities to becoming one of Eurasia’s important logistics links. This process has unfolded in a complex regional environment, where almost every major infrastructure project faced geopolitical competition, external skepticism, and political constraints.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan found itself in a difficult position. The country faced the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the occupation of part of its territory, and the effective isolation of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic from the mainland. At the same time, the transport infrastructure inherited from the Soviet Union had been designed primarily for internal links within the former unified space and was poorly suited to the new geopolitical realities.
Under these conditions, the development of transport communications became for Baku not only an economic issue, but also a strategic one. As early as the 1990s, Azerbaijan’s leadership began to view logistics as an element of national security and foreign policy agency. One important milestone was the international conference “Restoration of the Historic Silk Road,” held in Baku in 1998 at the initiative of Heydar Aliyev. It was from this period that a long-term policy began to take shape, aimed at turning Azerbaijan into one of Eurasia’s transport centers.
In the following years, Baku consistently invested in the development of international transport corridors, railway infrastructure, highways, seaports, and transit capacity. One of the key projects was the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, construction of which began in 2007. It provided a direct railway connection between the South Caucasus and Türkiye and became an important element of the East-West route.
The significance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway goes beyond that of an ordinary infrastructure project. This line strengthened transport connectivity between the Caspian region, the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and Europe, while also creating additional opportunities for increased cargo flows between China, Central Asia, and European markets.
At the same time, the project was implemented in a difficult political environment. Russia could view the development of alternative routes as a factor reducing regional dependence on Russian territory. In the United States, some political circles influenced by the Armenian agenda were critical of projects that deepened Armenia’s transport isolation. The European Union also did not always demonstrate sufficient consistency in supporting a number of regional initiatives. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan continued to implement the project on the basis of its own long-term interests.
In parallel, Baku actively developed maritime infrastructure on the Caspian Sea. The commissioning of the new international sea trade port in Alat and the development of Ro-Ro terminals strengthened the country’s position on the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. This became an important element in improving the competitiveness of the Middle Corridor, especially amid growing demand for alternative routes between Asia and Europe.
Another important direction was Azerbaijan’s work on the International North-South Transport Corridor. The modernization of road and railway infrastructure, the development of border crossings with Russia and Iran, and the expansion of transit capacity gradually strengthened Azerbaijan’s role as a connecting link between Russia, the South Caucasus, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean.
However, this direction also faces limitations. The Rasht-Astara railway section has been discussed for many years, but remains unfinished. The reasons are not limited to technical and financial issues; they are also connected to the broader political context. Within Iran, there are different views on Azerbaijan’s transport role, including caution among some elites toward projects that could alter the balance of communications in the region.
A new stage in the development of Azerbaijan’s transport strategy began after the Second Karabakh War. The restoration of control over the formerly occupied territories opened opportunities for the large-scale reconstruction of infrastructure in Karabakh and East Zangezur. The construction of new roads, railways, airports, and logistics facilities is gradually forming a new domestic and regional transport map.
In this context, the idea of a transport link between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan acquired particular importance. For Baku, this route has not only economic but also strategic significance, since it addresses the country’s long-standing geographical fragmentation. At the same time, such a corridor could become part of a broader system of regional connectivity in the South Caucasus.
In Armenia, this issue raises serious political concerns, primarily related to sovereignty and control over communications. These concerns have become part of domestic political debate and have often been amplified by external actors interested in preserving the existing transport configuration in the region. Iran, for its part, has traditionally been sensitive to any projects that could alter the balance of routes in the South Caucasus and affect its own transit role.
Despite these difficulties, Baku continued to promote the idea of regional transport unblocking at both the political and diplomatic levels. In 2025, with U.S. mediation, the parties began moving toward new formats for discussing regional communications, including the TRIPP initiative, which is viewed as one of the possible mechanisms for shaping a new transport architecture in the South Caucasus.
Azerbaijan’s experience shows that turning a country into a fully fledged node state requires several conditions: long-term political will, significant infrastructure investment, diplomatic flexibility, and the ability to pursue an independent transport policy under external pressure. If Baku had relied solely on the positions of external actors or on resistance from individual regional centers of power, much of the country’s modern transport and logistics infrastructure might never have been implemented.
Today, Azerbaijan is gradually integrating several strategic directions — East-West, North-South, and, in the future, routes connecting the Black Sea, Caspian, and Middle Eastern regions. That is why, amid the restructuring of global logistics, the country is increasingly perceived not merely as a transit territory, but as one of the important elements of Eurasia’s new geoeconomic architecture.
At the same time, competition over transport corridors is only intensifying. In the coming years, the struggle over routes, logistics centers, ports, railway hubs, and border crossings will become increasingly politicized. Control over infrastructure and access to resilient routes will directly influence the economic stability of states and their foreign policy capabilities.
Under these conditions, Azerbaijan has already demonstrated its ability not only to adapt to a changing transport environment, but also to shape its own agenda. Its strategy is based on the consistent expansion of infrastructure capacity, the diversification of routes, and the strengthening of the country’s role as a connecting link between several regions. This is precisely what makes Azerbaijan one of the most visible nodes of the new Eurasian connectivity.
