The military and political outcome achieved by Azerbaijan in Karabakh in 2020 was not limited to the restoration of territorial integrity; it also reshaped regional power relations and significantly altered the perception of transboundary ethnic and identity-related issues. This victory became a source of collective self-awareness and political confidence for Azerbaijanis living in different parts of the world. For ethnic Azerbaijanis residing in the Islamic Republic of Iran in particular, the post-war period marked a profound psychological and political turning point. The events during and after the war led to a reassessment, on both sides of the Arax River, of concepts such as state power, protection, and political will.
The outcomes of the Karabakh war elevated long-standing grievances among Azerbaijanis in Southern Azerbaijan to a new stage. Against the backdrop of nearly two centuries of structural inequality and the institutional denial of linguistic and cultural rights, Azerbaijan’s military and political success was perceived by these communities as a tangible source of support and reassurance. In this context, President Ilham Aliyev’s explicit statements that the protection of Azerbaijanis, including those living in Iran, constitutes a principled position of the Azerbaijani state should be understood not merely as political messaging, but as an articulation of state responsibility.
For many years, Azerbaijan has integrated the protection of the rights and security of Azerbaijanis living abroad into its broader foreign policy agenda. Amid internal tensions and protests in Iran, the fact that ethnic Azerbaijanis have been disproportionately exposed to repression has shifted the issue beyond the realm of domestic security and into the sphere of regional human rights. Available evidence indicates that arbitrary detentions, harsh interventions, and legal uncertainty are particularly prevalent among these communities. The Azerbaijani leadership has repeatedly emphasized that it closely monitors these developments and will not remain indifferent to violations of the rights of its compatriots.
One of the central arguments raised on international platforms concerns the structural inconsistencies in Iran’s approach toward ethnic minorities. As President Ilham Aliyev has pointed out, while educational institutions for the Armenian community operate in Iran, Azerbaijani children are denied access to schooling in their mother tongue. From a normative perspective, this disparity raises serious questions. Beyond selective implementation of cultural rights, such policies heighten the risk of linguistic assimilation. The gradual exclusion of the Azerbaijani language from education and the public sphere weakens its functional capacity and confines it to informal usage, leading to long-term cultural erosion.
Azerbaijan frames its engagement on this issue not as interference in the internal affairs of another state, but as advocacy for universal human and cultural rights. This framing has been instrumental in legitimizing the discussion of Southern Azerbaijan within international forums and distinguishing it from political radicalism. For Azerbaijanis living in the south, this approach also provides an important psychological assurance, encouraging a more consistent and purposeful pursuit of their legitimate rights.
At the same time, contradictions within Iran’s regional policy cannot be overlooked. Despite rhetoric emphasizing Islamic solidarity, Tehran maintained active economic, logistical, and political ties with Armenia throughout the period of Azerbaijan’s territorial occupation. International reports have documented Iran’s direct and indirect involvement in the destruction of occupied territories, the desecration of religious and cultural heritage, and the looting of natural resources. Iran’s particular role in facilitating the use of these areas for narcotics production and transit has also been widely noted.
Azerbaijan’s success in terminating these illegal activities during the 44-day war resulted in tangible strategic losses for Tehran. Against this backdrop, Iran’s shift toward more overt pressure rhetoric against Azerbaijan, the intensification of its relations with Armenia, and the expansion of its diplomatic and military presence in the region can be interpreted as reactions to changing geopolitical realities. These steps underscore the difficulties Iran faces in adapting to the new regional balance.
Ultimately, the Southern Azerbaijan issue occupies a systematic and long-term place within Azerbaijan’s regional policy rather than an emotional or reactive one. Baku seeks to keep this matter on the international agenda through the lenses of law, culture, and identity, not as a tool of escalation. Against the backdrop of Azerbaijan’s growing political and military weight, this approach has taken shape as a sustainable strategy aimed both at preserving regional stability and at protecting the rights of millions of Azerbaijanis living in Iran.
