The inaugural EU–Central Asia summit in the 5+1 format, held in Samarkand under the chairmanship of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, marked a significant milestone in the institutionalization of relations between the European Union and the five Central Asian republics. The presence of European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen underscored the bloc’s intention to strengthen its strategic engagement in the region.
This renewed focus on Central Asia must be viewed within a broader geopolitical and economic context. Facing the erosion of its influence in Eastern Europe and uncertainty over the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, Brussels is seeking alternative arenas in which to project its power. The potential exclusion of European interests from any post-conflict settlement negotiated primarily by Washington and Moscow has heightened the EU’s urgency to secure new spheres of influence. Central Asia — situated at the intersection of the North–South and East–West transit corridors and endowed with critical raw materials — has emerged as a key target of these ambitions.
The region presents a multifaceted appeal for the EU. It offers access to uranium, oil, gas, and rare earth metals—resources crucial for the development of renewable energy infrastructure, high-tech manufacturing, and the green transition. In contrast to past extractive models, the EU is now promoting an ostensibly partnership-oriented approach that includes the creation of vertically integrated value chains within the region. The Global Gateway initiative, launched as a strategic counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is central to this effort. Brussels has pledged up to €300 billion in investments by 2027 in developing economies, with Central Asia occupying a key position in this vision.
At the Samarkand summit, President von der Leyen announced a €12 billion investment package directed at four priority areas: transport connectivity (€3 billion), critical raw materials (€2.5 billion), energy transition (€6.4 billion), and digital connectivity (€100 million). However, the implementation of such initiatives faces significant constraints. Internally, the EU is grappling with structural economic challenges, political fragmentation, rising energy costs, and the electoral ascent of right-wing populist movements. Externally, the bloc faces robust competition from established actors in Central Asia, most notably China, Russia, Turkey, and increasingly, the United States.
China maintains a dominant position in infrastructure and transport projects across the region, bolstered by decades of strategic investments under the BRI framework. Russia, despite international sanctions, remains a pivotal partner in energy, security, and trade. Approximately 30% of Central Asia’s foreign trade is conducted with Russia, and over 24,000 enterprises in the region involve Russian capital. In recent years, a significant share of bilateral settlements has shifted to national currencies, a trend that potentially undermines the global dominance of the U.S. dollar and aligns with broader de-dollarization efforts within the BRICS framework.
Despite the EU’s rhetorical shift toward a “mutually beneficial” model of cooperation, Central Asian states have demonstrated a cautious, pragmatic stance. None have joined Western sanctions against Russia, and Brussels’ repeated demands for compliance have been met with resistance, as such actions could undermine their national interests and existing strategic partnerships. Moreover, the states of the region are acutely aware of their growing importance in global energy logistics and are actively seeking to diversify their foreign relations while maintaining a balanced, multi-vector foreign policy.
The leadership of Central Asian states emphasized the importance of modernization, technological cooperation, and equitable integration during the summit. President Mirziyoyev highlighted Uzbekistan’s collaboration with major European corporations such as TOTAL, Siemens, and BASF. Kazakhstan reaffirmed its role as a reliable energy supplier to Europe, contributing approximately 13% of the EU’s total oil imports. President Tokayev also announced trilateral energy projects involving Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, including plans for trans-Caspian electricity transmission infrastructure. Meanwhile, the presidents of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan expressed interest in EU investments in mineral extraction, energy cooperation, and digital development.
Yet, beyond the official declarations, the summit yielded no substantial breakthroughs. The final joint communiqué affirmed the desire to strengthen strategic cooperation and expand infrastructure connectivity, but it lacked binding commitments or concrete implementation mechanisms. This calls into question the EU’s ability to compete with entrenched regional actors, particularly when its own financial and political foundations are under stress.
The EU’s pivot to Central Asia is, in many respects, a compensatory move driven by diminishing strategic opportunities elsewhere. The perceived failure of the Ukrainian policy, coupled with the loss of influence in parts of Africa and the Middle East, has led Brussels to view Central Asia as one of the few remaining geopolitical arenas where it can still project relevance. However, this projection is limited by its increasingly adversarial stance toward both Russia and China, its uneasy alignment with U.S. strategic goals, and the region’s reluctance to be drawn into zero-sum geopolitical rivalries.
In this context, the EU’s strategy can be interpreted as a search for a “fifth corner”—an effort to redefine its global posture amid a shifting international order. Whether this effort will succeed depends not only on Brussels’ capacity to deliver promised investments but also on its ability to respect the agency and sovereignty of the Central Asian states. These countries, in turn, appear increasingly committed to reinforcing their own regional connectivity and diplomatic autonomy. Their collective response to external overtures suggests that any future engagement—European or otherwise—will require a high degree of sensitivity to the region’s complex geopolitical realities.
