Over recent years, Russia has demonstrated systematic yet ineffective attempts to exploit the so-called “Talysh” and “Lezgin” factors as instruments of pressure on Azerbaijan. These efforts have taken various forms — from thematic events held outside the country to publications in media outlets affiliated with state structures, where a narrative has been deliberately constructed about allegedly existing “problems of national minorities” in Azerbaijan. This approach is by no means new for Russia and is rooted in an outdated paradigm that treats ethnic identity as a vulnerable lever for undermining state resilience. However, Azerbaijan’s socio-political reality has long since exposed the fallacy of this model.
In the early 1990s, during the formative period of independence, Azerbaijan — like other post-Soviet states — was institutionally and politically vulnerable. The absence of stable state mechanisms, military defeat, and the occupation of a significant part of its territory (with Russia’s support) created conditions in which any external destabilizing signals could be perceived as an existential threat. At that time, such narratives indeed possessed destructive potential.
Since then, the state’s structural parameters have changed radically. Azerbaijan has undergone a phase of institutional consolidation, while the war to restore territorial integrity became a systemic test of societal and state resilience. Under conditions of direct threat, the country demonstrated an ability to consolidate and mobilize on the basis of civic loyalty rather than ethnic or confessional affiliation. This fundamentally refutes claims about the existence of internal fault lines that could be exploited to destabilize the country.
Equally telling is the reaction of Azerbaijani society itself, including representatives of national minorities, who have publicly and unequivocally demonstrated the absence of any demand for external “mediation” or “protection.” This points to a high level of social integration and undermines attempts to engineer artificial internal conflict.
At the same time, Azerbaijan’s strategic patience is by no means unlimited. Any actions aimed at undermining the internal stability of a sovereign state inevitably provoke a response. This is not a matter of emotion but a basic principle of international politics: states possessing institutional and political resources respond to challenges that affect their security.
In this context, Azerbaijan has accumulated practical experience in bringing issues of neocolonialism, discrimination, and the asymmetric application of international law onto the international agenda. This experience has proven effective and has led to adjustments in the behavior of several European states, such as France and the Netherlands, which had previously adopted a confrontational stance. This has demonstrated the potential for an asymmetric political response within international institutions and discursive platforms.
The historical dimension also plays a significant role. The policy of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus was classically colonial in nature and was accompanied by violence, deportations, and demographic transformations. Azerbaijan, like other peoples of the region, was drawn into this system of forced integration. Contemporary international discussions on genocides and ethnic cleansing in the nineteenth century underscore that these processes are not marginal topics but form part of a broader European and global historical responsibility.
Illustrative in this regard are international expert discussions devoted to the deportations and mass destruction of indigenous peoples of the Caucasus during the period of imperial expansion. These events are viewed not as political instruments but as matters of historical justice. Analysts point to a structural continuity of repressive practices — from the imperial era through the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.
Special attention should also be paid to the situation of ethnic and religious minorities in contemporary Russia. Formally declared equality of rights is not always confirmed in practice. Social marginalization, the rise of xenophobia, and the use of representatives of national minorities as a resource in military conflicts generate additional tension. Documented cases of hate-motivated violence only deepen doubts about the effectiveness of existing human rights protection mechanisms.
Should Moscow make a conscious choice in favor of a confrontational line, Azerbaijan possesses sufficient political, diplomatic, and discursive instruments to defend its interests. At the same time, there remains a rational hope that strategic thinking will prevail within the Russian political establishment, taking into account the long-term consequences of such a policy. Historical experience shows that ignoring the limits of what is permissible almost always leads to a backlash — both in the international arena and within states themselves.
