Germany-Azerbaijan relations have gone through ups and downs and been tested in various ways following our glorious victory in the Patriotic War. These challenges have often been accompanied by provocations aimed at undermining bilateral ties. Germany’s expanding relations with Armenia and its stance on the Karabakh issue particularly require attention. Nevertheless, both states have the willpower to overcome these tests and elevate their relations to a new level.
Before visiting Azerbaijan, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier was on an official trip to Armenia. During this visit, a post on his official social media account included an image featuring the “flag” of the former illegal regime in Karabakh. Moreover, Germany’s state broadcaster “Deutsche Welle” aired a program filled with false information targeting our country. However, following strong protests from the Azerbaijani side, the Office of the German President issued a formal apology. During his meeting with President Ilham Aliyev and the subsequent press conference, President Steinmeier reaffirmed that Germany recognizes Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. This move is characteristic of Germany’s usual approach—what can be termed a “German-style balancing act.”
Germany has consistently aimed to pursue a neutral and balanced foreign policy in the South Caucasus. However, after Azerbaijan eliminated the former separatist regime in Karabakh in 2023 and the voluntary mass migration of Armenians from the region ended the 30-year geopolitical status quo, Germany began adjusting its regional strategy to serve its interests. Several factors contributed to this shift:
The EU-led conflict mediation process failed;
Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus grew—partially offset by Turkey—weakening European leverage;
The EU’s, including Germany’s, maneuvering space diminished.
To regain influence in the region, Germany began leveraging Armenia. Armenia’s simulated pro-Western integration policy created a conducive environment for this. Consequently, Germany engaged in several actions contrary to Azerbaijani interests. For instance, from 2020 to 2023, Germany provided Armenia with “humanitarian aid,” including tons of supplies via its Defense Ministry. However, this assistance morphed into military aid following a decision in July 2024. The European Peace Facility (EPF), which allocated €10 million in military aid to Armenia, was established under Germany’s EU Council presidency in March 2020, and Armenia was its first beneficiary. Another €10 million military aid package was approved in March 2025. Germany has played the role of an “invisible hand” in organizing European support for Armenia. For example, although the EUMA mission (EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia) is presented as a joint European mission, on February 15, 2023, German Federal Government spokesperson Steffen Hebestreit announced that the mission on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, with extended mandate and increased personnel, would be led by the German federal police.
Even Michael Roth, Chairman of the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee (and former German Minister for European Affairs), called for the establishment of a fact-finding mission by the Council of Europe in Karabakh and for EUMA to operate in Azerbaijan in his August 30, 2023, post. Naturally, this proposal was received negatively in Azerbaijan. Roth has continually advocated for increased aid, including military aid, to Armenia. Several German MPs have also played an active role in anti-Azerbaijani hysteria in the European Parliament. For example, when the topic of “abused Armenian POWs” was raised, Germany’s Viola von Cramon joined EU Special Representative Toivo Klaar in calling for sanctions against Azerbaijan. Moreover, eight of the 49 MEPs who proposed a resolution against Azerbaijan after the one-day anti-terror operation of September 19-20, 2023—calling for sanctions against Azerbaijani officials and cessation of EU gas imports—were from Germany (Michael Gahler, David McAllister, Daniel Caspary, Udo Bullmann, Matthias Ecke, Moritz Körner, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann). This resolution passed on October 24, 2024, with 453 votes in favor, 31 against, and 89 abstentions. Renata Alt, Chair of the Bundestag’s Human Rights Committee, even proposed sanctions against Azerbaijan and its leaders during the early days of the eco-protest in Karabakh, accusing Azerbaijan of imposing a “blockade.”
It is evident that certain factions within Germany’s political elite are actively involved in anti-Azerbaijani propaganda and political maneuvering. However, this “army” does not yet hold dominant influence over top-level German government decisions. That is why, on October 31, 2023, Germany’s Ambassador to Armenia, Viktor Richter, stated during a meeting with members of Armenia’s friendship group with Germany in its parliament that there is no consensus within the German government on imposing sanctions against Azerbaijan. As noted earlier, all this forms part of Germany’s so-called balancing policy.
As part of this policy, Bundestag members from the AfD (Alternative for Germany) made illegal visits to Karabakh. One of them, Steffen Kotré, even called for sanctions against Azerbaijan and Turkey, accusing them of committing “genocide” against Armenians in Artsakh (Karabakh). Nevertheless, Germany took important steps to demonstrate that it does not support sanctions. For example, in October 2020, when Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis called for EU sanctions on Turkey (a country supplying arms to Azerbaijan), it was Germany—along with Spain, Italy, Hungary, and Malta—that blocked this proposal.
These developments indicate that Germany will likely continue to uphold a dual-standard policy in the South Caucasus under the guise of “balancing.” It is no coincidence that when President Steinmeier was asked during a press conference in Baku why there had been no Western sanctions against Armenia during its 30-year occupation of Azerbaijani territories, he linked the absence of such calls to Germany’s “balanced policy.” In other words, Germany refrained from sanctioning an aggressor to maintain balance but still recognizes Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. That is the reality. The whole world—including Armenia—acknowledges Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory. However, focusing on what’s happening behind the scenes reveals the real story. For instance, during the recent Munich Security Conference on February 15, Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan held secret meetings with NATO generals in Germany. If the status quo can be changed through force and countries like Germany remain silent under the banner of “balanced policy,” what does rearming Armenia suggest?
It would be desirable for Germany to maintain true balance and avoid pro-Armenian military-political decisions. Key indicators of a balanced approach would include providing aid from the EPF to Azerbaijan as well, restoring our representation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and expanding military-political and economic cooperation with Germany.
To achieve this, it is essential to expose the politicians in Germany and Europe who spread propaganda against Azerbaijan and belong to the global Armenian network. Just as Trump is now exposing USAID operations, we hope that one day the German government will uncover the fabricators of false “investigations” accusing Azerbaijan.
In September 2021, Deutsche Welle published a report alleging corruption links between Azerbaijani officials and German politicians, particularly from the CDU/CSU. Following this, some German politicians faced legal prosecution. Those accused of having corrupt ties with Azerbaijan were from the CDU/CSU—the party that came to power after the February 23 elections. Members of the anti-Azerbaijan network are now aiming to overturn the 2016 resolution passed by PACE, which was supported by the same MPs. That resolution called for Armenia to be held accountable for eco-terrorism. However, PACE never enforced it. Instead, the German MPs who supported it were persecuted and sidelined from politics. This was not the first and certainly won’t be the last time. The global Armenian network has actively organized attacks on pro-Azerbaijani figures across Europe. The “Zöllmer case” also comes to mind, alongside the 2019 corruption investigation against German MPs and the 2021 documentary in the Bundestag.
In 2015, Manfred Zöllmer, head of a visiting Bundestag delegation to Baku, stated that Germany always supported Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and promised that during Germany’s OSCE chairmanship in 2016, it would do its utmost to resolve the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Yet by 2017, Zöllmer’s political career had ended. This shows how the global Armenian network and its allies infiltrate the German administration and aim to undermine Azerbaijan-Germany relations. Those who foster stronger bilateral ties are their primary targets. The future of Germany-Azerbaijan relations will depend on exposing those behind the “flag provocation” in the German President’s Office and those fabricating false agendas to sabotage bilateral relations.
This is crucial not only for maintaining Germany’s balanced policy but also for ensuring the success of future strategic regional projects. Otherwise, a pro-Armenian strategy disguised as European integration could lead to the collapse of Germany’s South Caucasus policy. Yet, Germany has the opportunity to elevate relations to a new level through cooperation in traditional (oil and gas) and green energy sectors, global transport-logistics projects, and even in the reconstruction of Karabakh. Utilizing these opportunities would not only help Azerbaijan grow its economic and political potential but also enhance Germany’s—and more broadly Europe’s—security and strategic role in regional affairs.
In this context, President Steinmeier’s visit to Azerbaijan may signal the opening of new cooperation doors and a shift away from the pre-February 23 trajectory. Signs of this intention were visible during his South Caucasus tour. For instance, acknowledging the growing interest of Azerbaijani youth in studying in Germany and learning German, Steinmeier might decide to open a DAAD office in Baku. Similarly, the KfW (German Development Bank), which previously closed its office in Baku, might resume operations and contribute to the “Great Return” to Karabakh. This would also mark a “great return” to warm Azerbaijan-Germany relations. However, it is still too early to speak of mutual understanding. Many steps are yet to be taken.
