Azerbaijan has officially notified Moscow of the termination of “Rossotrudnichestvo” operations in the country, which means the “Russian House” in Baku is likely to close. This is an unprecedented move in Azerbaijani-Russian relations, and there is no doubt that this is not merely an administrative decision, but a serious diplomatic démarche signaling a shift in the direction of bilateral ties. Previously, the “Russian House” in Baku was allowed to operate even without official registration, but the situation has now changed.
At the same time, the Baku Court of Appeals overturned the arrest of former judge Yelena Khakhaleva, who is wanted in Russia on fraud charges, placing her instead under police supervision. On the surface, this may seem like a routine legal ruling, but in reality, it sends another clear signal: Baku will not automatically comply with Moscow’s requests and demands. This marks yet another indication that Azerbaijan’s approach to its relationship with Russia is undergoing significant changes.
The question remains whether Azerbaijan’s provision of humanitarian aid to Ukraine fits into this broader trend. Baku has been assisting Kyiv since as early as February 2022, but in the current geopolitical context, President Ilham Aliyev’s recent decision to allocate additional funds for such aid reinforces the impression that Azerbaijan is distancing itself from Moscow. There is no doubt that a turning point in these relations was the downing of an AZAL aircraft on the Baku-Grozny route by Russian air defense forces. However, even before this incident, Azerbaijan had been pursuing an independent foreign policy. President Aliyev’s firm stance against Russian arms shipments to Armenia during the 44-day war, criticism of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh, and the early termination of Russia’s peacekeeping mission all serve as examples of Baku’s assertive approach. Additionally, Azerbaijan has been working on diversifying its gas exports and establishing communication hubs that bypass Russia.
Moscow’s contrasting attitudes towards Baku and Yerevan also provide food for thought. Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia has not taken institutional steps to reduce its dependence on Russia. It remains a member of the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), hosts a Russian military base, and maintains joint air defense and ground force operations with Moscow. Furthermore, Armenia continues to facilitate large-scale circumvention of Western sanctions against Russia. Yet, despite these ties, Armenia’s current leadership consistently criticizes and even humiliates Moscow in public statements. Remarkably, the Kremlin tolerates this behavior and still refers to Armenia as an “ally” and a “brotherly nation.”
Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has adopted a different model of engagement with Russia. Historically, Baku prioritized pragmatism and avoided unnecessary confrontations. Russian language education was supported, with hundreds of schools offering instruction in Russian, and official statements remained measured and diplomatic.
However, it seems that Moscow has misinterpreted Baku’s restraint as an invitation to act with imperial arrogance. Now, Azerbaijan is making it clear that its patience has limits. And more importantly, institutional actions will follow. While Baku has traditionally preferred to resolve conflicts through confidential diplomatic channels without escalating rhetoric, this only applies when problems can be resolved. It appears that Moscow underestimated this nuance and failed to make necessary reciprocal adjustments.
Some claim that while Azerbaijani media has published “anti-Russian articles,” Moscow has refrained from harsh rhetoric against Azerbaijan. This is a misconception. First, Russian officials put forward theories about the AZAL plane crash that President Aliyev rightly dismissed as “absurd.” Second, Kremlin-aligned commentators, political analysts, and media figures launched open attacks on Azerbaijan, engaging in what many local experts described as “dancing on the graves” following the tragic incident. This was neither an accident nor an isolated opinion. Moreover, despite Azerbaijan’s repeated calls, none of these commentators faced any consequences—even for using explicit language on live broadcasts.
The current situation is revealing: Moscow only reacts when it is forced into a position of accountability. This might explain why, in relations with Armenia, the Kremlin tolerates repeated diplomatic slights, while in dealings with Azerbaijan, it assumes Baku will maintain its traditional restraint. However, Azerbaijan is now making it clear that restraint has its limits. If the Kremlin wants to preserve relations with Baku, it will have to adjust its approach. The key question is how quickly Moscow will recognize this reality.
One thing is certain: such upheavals do not pass without consequences. Russia’s image in Azerbaijan has already suffered significant damage. If there is to be any chance of restoring its standing, Moscow will need a fundamentally different level of diplomatic engagement. Perhaps the main takeaway here is that the only way to earn Moscow’s respect is to set firm boundaries and enforce them decisively.
