Recently, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk announced a forecasted trade turnover between Russia and Armenia in 2024 ranging from $14 to $16 billion, signaling nearly a doubling of trade volume within a single year. Considering that in 2023, trade between the two countries grew by 56%, this dynamic confirms a persistent upward trend.
However, this raises doubts about the Armenian authorities’ claims of aligning more closely with the West, especially the European Union and the United States. In terms of international relations, economic ties play a crucial role in shaping a country’s genuine foreign policy stance. The question arises: why, despite Armenia’s pronounced desire to distance itself from Russia, do Western countries—who provide substantial political and economic support to Armenia—remain silent about the rising trade turnover with Russia, a country under Western sanctions?
Since 2022, following the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the imposition of international sanctions on Russia, Armenia has become the fourth largest exporter of semiconductors and other dual-use goods to the Russian Federation. In 2022, Armenia’s GDP grew by over 14%, catching the attention of international media. The British newspaper The Telegraph notably described this growth as “nutso numbers,” highlighting that it made Armenia one of the fastest-growing economies in the world.
In the summer of 2023, Jim O’Brien, Director of the U.S. State Department’s Office of Sanctions Coordination, pointed out that Armenia is involved in circumventing Western sanctions. This is corroborated by official data: according to Armenian Deputy Minister of Finance Vahan Sirunyan, exports to Russia increased by 85% in the first nine months of 2023, with re-exports accounting for about 80.6% of this growth. Exports of goods originating from Armenia made up only 4.4% of the total increase.
Ze’ev Khanin, head of the post-Soviet conflict research program at Israel’s Begin-Sadat Center, expressed concern over Armenia becoming a major hub for goods supplies to Russia, bypassing sanctions. A similar stance was taken by the American think tank Jamestown Foundation, which noted suspicions regarding Armenia’s role in the re-export of sanctioned products to Russia.
In February 2024, economist Robin Brooks, representing the Institute of International Finance, presented data showing that Armenian exports to Russia had grown by 430% compared to the pre-conflict period. He also pointed to a surge in exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and the UAE, suggesting that goods from these countries ultimately make their way to Russia.
This increase in trade with Russia not only supports Armenia’s economic stability but may also serve as an important source of funding for its military expenditures. The situation illustrates the strategic ambivalence of the West. Outwardly, Western nations speak of peace, yet in practice, their actions—or lack thereof—allow Armenia to build up its military potential, undermining regional stability and intensifying tensions.
Conclusion
The aforementioned figures and facts underscore the need for further analysis of Armenia’s relations with the West. Despite the clear discrepancy between Yerevan’s declared political priorities and its economic actions, the West continues to provide military and economic support to Armenia. Despite numerous warnings and concerns from various Western countries, no significant sanctions have been imposed on Armenia.
This situation raises questions about double standards in the enforcement of sanctions policy. While sanction evasion by China and Turkey is seen as a threat, in the case of Armenia, this process seems to continue on seemingly legitimate grounds. This suggests the possibility of Western strategic patience toward Armenia, given its geopolitical position and the potential use of the country as a field of contest between Russia and the West.