Russia’s Shrinking Space: The Rise of a South Caucasus–Central Asia Bloc

Central Asia is undergoing rapid geopolitical shifts as the U.S., Türkiye, and Azerbaijan expand regional engagement, forming a new “group of six” that limits Russia’s influence. Azerbaijan’s accession to the consultative format and assertive regional diplomacy challenge Moscow, whose reactive policies struggle to keep pace with accelerating integration dynamics.

Dr. Orkhan Zamanli
Dr. Orkhan Zamanli
Central Asian leaders meet with US President Donald Trump at the White House on November 6. Source: president.kz

In recent months, Central Asia has entered a phase of noticeable political activation. Two key developments have unfolded in the region in a short span of time. First, the leaders of the Central Asian states traveled to Washington, where the United States, within the C5+1 format, proposed a new model of engagement and underscored the region’s strategic importance. Shortly afterward, Tashkent hosted an expanded meeting with Azerbaijan, effectively formalizing a new “5+1” political configuration—this time without a Western component. Against the backdrop of rising engagement from the United States, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, Russia’s traditional instruments of influence are beginning to falter, and its room for maneuver is visibly shrinking.

It was at this moment that another important step was officially confirmed: the participation of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev in the Consultative Meeting of the Leaders of Central Asia, which for the first time in history will be held in 2026 in the “Central Asia and Azerbaijan” format under Turkmenistan’s chairmanship. In his letter to Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Aliyev emphasized that he accepted the invitation “with great pleasure,” noting the historical significance of Azerbaijan joining a format that brings together a region with considerable political and economic power. Aliyev also stressed that Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states together form a strategically important historical and cultural space, and that the rapid development of their partnership adds new depth to integration processes.

It is evident that the emergence of this new “group of six”—a union linking the South Caucasus and Central Asia into a single geopolitical contour—has become an alarming signal for Moscow. The growing military cooperation between Baku and Ankara expands the presence of Türkiye, a NATO member, across the Central Asian vector. The United States is also closely following the process: the Washington visit by regional leaders made it clear that the emerging format is under direct Western observation.

Following the U.S. trip, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev traveled to Moscow, reaffirming the strategic character of bilateral relations. However, the Kremlin can no longer rely on its previous level of influence. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain the most vulnerable to Russian initiatives due to economic dependence and migration flows, yet even over Bishkek Moscow cannot exert pressure as easily as before: Japarov has consistently demonstrated a more autonomous stance.

Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin’s visit to Kyrgyzstan and his participation in the CSTO summit appear to be Moscow’s attempt to prevent the consolidation of a new regional actor emerging without its involvement. The Kremlin aims to secure additional guarantees of loyalty and remind partners of allied commitments—especially given Russia’s key military facilities in the region, including the airbase in Kant and the base in Kulob. Moscow may propose their modernization or an increased military presence in an effort to offset declining political leverage.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are pursuing a more autonomous line, balancing among Moscow, Ankara, Beijing, and Washington. This heightens the Kremlin’s unease as it watches its traditional sphere of influence contract both in the Caucasus and in Central Asia.

In this new environment, Moscow’s reactive policy is no longer effective: developments are unfolding faster than its strategic documents can be updated. Putin’s trip to Bishkek is therefore an attempt to regain the initiative where Russian influence still carries weight, relying on military-political presence and economic ties.

The key question lies elsewhere: Can Russia adapt to the new rules of the game? Will it become a full participant in the emerging Eurasian architecture, or will it once again be forced to catch up after events have already moved on? The answers to these questions will determine whether Putin’s visit to Kyrgyzstan becomes a step toward reinforcing influence—or merely a belated attempt not to fall behind a rapidly changing region.

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