On October 7, Reuters reported, citing sources familiar with the negotiations, that Russian-Chinese consultations on the construction of the new Power of Siberia-2 pipeline — previously presented by Moscow as having reached “legally binding agreements” — have failed to produce consensus on key parameters. The revelation underscores the growing uncertainty surrounding Russia’s eastward energy ambitions and highlights the narrowing space for Gazprom’s global maneuvering.
For Moscow, the Chinese vector has long been portrayed as the strategic alternative to Europe — a “lifeline” for an industry that once served as the financial foundation of the Russian state. Yet the latest developments reveal that this fallback option is far from secure. Beijing’s negotiating stance, rooted in pragmatic calculation and energy diversification, exposes the asymmetry of the relationship and the limits of Russia’s leverage.
Since 2022, Russia’s gas model — built on decades of dependence on European demand — has entered structural decline. Pipeline deliveries to Europe have fallen by nearly 80 percent. The European Union, having learned from the supply shocks of 2022, is accelerating its diversification: long-term LNG contracts with the United States, Qatar, and Norway are now in place, while partnerships with Azerbaijan and Algeria have strengthened. The continent that once consumed the bulk of Russia’s gas has effectively closed its market to Moscow.
Against this backdrop, the “pivot to the East” has become a strategic necessity rather than a choice. However, the Power of Siberia-2 project — intended as the flagship of this shift — remains stalled. Beijing continues to reject Moscow’s proposed terms on price and routing, fully aware of Gazprom’s dependency. China’s broader energy strategy emphasizes diversification of supply: expanding domestic production, deepening ties with Turkmenistan, Qatar, and Myanmar, investing in LNG capacity, and accelerating the transition toward renewables. Within this matrix, Russia is simply one of many suppliers, not a privileged partner. Even if the pipeline were eventually built, its export potential would be insufficient to offset the loss of the European market.
The southern vector offers little consolation. Türkiye, once among Russia’s largest gas importers, is redefining its role as an energy hub rather than a client. The discovery of gas reserves in the Black Sea, coupled with the diversification of supply sources — from Azerbaijan, Iran, Israel, and the Eastern Mediterranean — has reduced Ankara’s structural dependence on Russian gas. For Moscow, Türkiye is now a competitor in the regional energy architecture rather than a captive market.
The Iranian route, previously discussed as an alternative transit corridor involving Azerbaijan, remains equally uncertain. Political risks, overlapping export ambitions, and Western sanctions have made its realization highly problematic. Tehran, pursuing its own energy assertiveness, increasingly views Russia as a rival. The recent cooling in Moscow–Baku relations has further eroded the feasibility of any joint framework. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, continues to consolidate its autonomy in foreign and energy policy. Its cooperation with the EU, Türkiye, and Central Asian states — especially within the framework of the Southern Gas Corridor — is designed to position Baku not as a transit actor for Russian gas, but as an independent supplier in its own right. Participation in Russian-Iranian energy schemes would expose Azerbaijan to sanctions and contradict its long-term strategy of integration with European markets and capital.
Central Asia, another region once viewed by Gazprom as a potential compensatory direction, is also slipping out of Moscow’s grasp. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are pursuing energy independence through investment in domestic extraction, infrastructure, and new export corridors. The 2024 gas discovery in Uzbekistan opens prospects for partial self-sufficiency and even future exports, while Turkmenistan’s commitment to the Trans-Caspian project — providing direct access to Europe without Russian mediation — further underscores the erosion of Gazprom’s regional influence.
Taken together, these dynamics point to a systemic contraction of Russia’s gas geography. The erosion of European markets, the fragility of the Chinese track, and the shrinking of southern and Central Asian options all contribute to a growing sense of strategic isolation.
Ironically, had Moscow managed to sustain a functional partnership with Baku, the outcome might have been different. A cooperative framework with Azerbaijan could have allowed Russia to maintain a presence in South Caucasian energy corridors and preserve a degree of flexibility in its export strategy. Instead, political estrangement and the loss of trust have foreclosed that avenue.
Even if future deliveries to China materialize, their profitability will remain far below pre-2022 levels. More importantly, Russia’s standing as a “gas superpower” — a cornerstone of its economic and geopolitical identity for decades — continues to erode. In the context of accelerating global energy transition and the growing dominance of renewables, Moscow’s export model is becoming structurally obsolete. Without a credible strategy for adaptation or diversification, Russia’s role in the global energy order risks being reduced from that of a system-shaping actor to a marginal supplier.
