Türkiye’s official application for full membership in BRICS came just a month after Azerbaijan’s similar move. During the Eastern Economic Forum held from September 3 to 6 in Vladivostok, Russian President’s aide Yuri Ushakov confirmed that Türkiye had applied for full membership in BRICS. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is also expected to participate in the upcoming BRICS summit, scheduled to take place in Kazan from October 22 to 24. Despite Türkiye’s strong economic ties with the bloc’s current members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, the UAE, and Ethiopia), the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has faced occasional political-diplomatic crises with these countries. This article will discuss the existing political and economic relationships between the Erdoğan government and BRICS member states and analyze the rationale behind Türkiye’s bid for full membership in the alliance.
Since its founding, the Republic of Türkiye has followed a pro-Western foreign policy. Like Azerbaijan, it has held the status of a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), one of the significant Eastern blocs, since 2012. Countries with this status are allowed to cooperate with full member states in specific areas and within a limited framework. Although Erdoğan has periodically emphasized the importance of Türkiye becoming a full member of the SCO, no serious efforts have been made to raise its status. While the SCO is not a military alliance, unlike BRICS, it is a regional intergovernmental organization covering a specific geography and focusing more on security issues. Russia and China, in particular, have shown little enthusiasm for Türkiye, a NATO member and close US ally in the Middle East, joining the SCO as a full member.
BRICS, by contrast, is primarily an international group focused on intergovernmental economic cooperation. The economic weight of the BRICS countries has long been one of the appealing aspects for Türkiye, which has been experiencing severe economic challenges. Undoubtedly, recent problems and uncertainties with the United States and the European Union have also pushed Ankara to deepen its multilateral cooperation with non-Western economic alliances. It would not be wrong to say that the AKP, unable to achieve its goals in the West, has intensified its Eastern-oriented policy. In recent years, East Asia, especially China, has become an essential region in Türkiye’s foreign policy course. The region’s status as one of the world’s leading financial centers has motivated the AKP to accelerate the development of comprehensive and constructive relations with East Asian countries. Thus, Türkiye has been pursuing a targeted and balanced foreign policy toward East Asia since the launch of the “Asia Anew” initiative in 2019. Türkiye’s steps toward the SCO and BRICS can be assessed within this context.
Although Russia, the current BRICS chair, has expressed support for Türkiye’s inclusion in the alliance, it should be noted that all decisions within BRICS are made collectively by consensus. In this sense, the position of the other BRICS members on the issue is not yet fully known. A glance at recent history shows that Türkiye has had political confrontations with each BRICS member over various issues. As a result, there are significant arguments that increase the likelihood that BRICS members may not unanimously accept Türkiye into the alliance.
Let’s start with Türkiye-China relations. Over the past decade, the significant development of bilateral economic ties has contributed to a positive shift in relations, particularly with an increase in Chinese investments in Türkiye. However, diplomatic events have periodically strained the relations between the two governments. One such issue is the Uyghur question, which has impacted Turkish-Chinese diplomatic ties from time to time. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region during his official trip to China in June this year signals that Ankara continues to keep the Uyghurs in focus. In essence, Türkiye’s stance on the Uyghur issue, its statements on Turkish unity within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and the AKP’s efforts to foster closer ties with Central Asian Turkic countries, which form China’s western borders, have led Beijing to view its relations with Ankara with skepticism and caution.
Another BRICS member with which Türkiye has had fluctuating relations is Russia. While ties have remained stable in recent years, conflicts of interest in the Middle East have long strained Turkish-Russian relations. Türkiye’s decision not to join the international sanctions against Russia over the Russia-Ukraine war has helped maintain diplomatic stability, while also contributing to a 50% increase in bilateral trade. Although it is difficult to predict how long this positive trend in relations will continue, it can be expected that Moscow will continue to support Türkiye’s BRICS membership bid. The fact that the first news of Türkiye’s application for full BRICS membership came from Russia is no coincidence.
Another BRICS member with fragile relations with Türkiye is Egypt. As is well known, relations between Ankara and Cairo deteriorated following the 2013 military coup in Egypt, which saw the ousting of Mohamed Morsi’s government, heavily supported by Türkiye. After Erdoğan harshly criticized General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who led the coup, tensions between the two countries reached their peak. The two sides’ support for opposing political and military factions in Libya further contributed to the deterioration of Turkish-Egyptian relations. However, with President Sisi’s visit to Ankara in September 2024, following a 12-year hiatus, bilateral ties have been revived. Furthermore, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s two visits to Egypt since taking office have played a significant role in easing the long-standing diplomatic rift between Ankara and Cairo.
In the Gulf, one of the BRICS members with which Türkiye has long had regional problems is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Diplomatic relations between Ankara and Abu Dhabi were disrupted during the 2017 Gulf crisis due to the blockade of Qatar. The UAE’s participation in the blockade alongside allied Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Bahrain) and Türkiye’s military presence in Qatar were among the factors that intensified tensions. It is worth noting that Türkiye and the UAE also stood on opposing sides in the Libyan conflict. Additionally, during the 2013 military coup in Egypt, Abu Dhabi supported the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood, whom Ankara had strongly backed. Erdoğan’s state visit to the UAE in February 2022 and his trip to the Gulf countries (including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) in July 2023 were aimed at gradually restoring and realigning political and economic relations with the Arab world.
In the Middle East, Iran, Türkiye’s long-standing rival, is also a relatively recent member of BRICS, like Egypt and the UAE. While there is extensive cooperation between the two countries in the energy sector, several geostrategic factors have contributed to the dramatic shifts in Türkiye-Iran relations. The chaotic political developments in Syria and Iraq continue to influence the dynamics of Turkish-Iranian relations. Moreover, Türkiye’s steadily growing influence in the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War has been another factor that worries Iran.
Undoubtedly, the recent historical events mentioned above can be characterized as factors that may affect Türkiye’s accession process to BRICS. On the other hand, it seems that after Erdoğan’s victory in the 2023 presidential elections, he has chosen a path of constructive engagement with the countries with which relations were previously strained, particularly BRICS members. Thus, it can be said that Türkiye hopes to gain support from BRICS member states on its path to full membership.
From an economic perspective, Türkiye’s entry into BRICS could help expand its economic relations with its largest trade partners across various sectors. China and Russia, the two main founders of BRICS, hold significant shares in Türkiye’s foreign trade. In the first quarter of 2024, China exported $3.9 billion worth of goods to Türkiye, making it Türkiye’s largest trade partner, while Russia took second place with $3.6 billion. It is clear that attracting new financial resources and foreign investments for the recovery of Türkiye’s shrinking economy and fragile financial system will be one of Ankara’s main priorities within BRICS.
Moreover, Türkiye’s proximity to Europe, one of the world’s largest consumer markets, may attract export-oriented economies like China and India to support Türkiye’s membership in BRICS. Türkiye’s dynamic labor force and favorable conditions for foreign investment may encourage these countries to establish manufacturing facilities in Türkiye and engage in technology transfer. It is worth noting that major Chinese tech companies such as BYD, Huawei, Xiaomi, TCL, BBK, and TECNO have already established production lines in Türkiye.
Additionally, through long-term loans provided by the New Development Bank (NDB), which has been operating under BRICS since 2015, Türkiye could build crucial land and sea-based logistics infrastructure, essential for the international supply chain. This could support the optimization and enhancement of the Middle Corridor (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), one of the alternative routes for cargo transportation between China and Europe. Despite being a strategically located country along the Middle Corridor, Türkiye remains underdeveloped in terms of its intercontinental cargo-handling capacity. It is worth recalling that in 2017, Mehmet Şimşek, Türkiye’s former Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs (2015-2018), mentioned that discussions regarding Türkiye’s membership in the NDB were already underway.
While the expansion of BRICS is often seen as deepening global polarization, based on the bloc’s doctrine, it can be expected that Türkiye, like other members, will focus on strengthening multilateral commercial relations in the long term. Türkiye’s attempts to join Eastern-based international organizations, first the SCO and then BRICS, can also be seen as a political move to send a message to the West. Furthermore, the fact that BRICS does not impose any strict political obligations on its member states regarding cooperation with other international organizations creates favorable opportunities for Türkiye, an ambitious state that seeks to pursue an independent regional policy. Moreover, Türkiye’s dual membership in both NATO and BRICS could position Ankara to play a mediating role in the relations between Russia, China, and the West.
Vusal Guliyev is Head of Shanghai Office at AZEGLOB Consulting Group. He is also a Policy Expert at the Topchubashov Center and an Associate Research Fellow at Khazar University in Baku. He is a graduate of Shanghai International Studies University.