Allies in Discord: Azerbaijan’s Auxiliary Goal as Mediator between Türkiye and Israel

This study by our center’s expert, Saleh Mehdizade (PhD, the School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University), was first published in The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies (VOL 9.2, DOI: 10.26351/JIMES/9-2/3) at Ariel University Israel.

Abstract

This study examines Azerbaijan’s role as a potential mediator in Turkish-Israeli relations from a neoclassical realist perspective. The aftermath of the Second Karabakh War has raised the possibility of Azerbaijan mediating between Türkiye and Israel. This analysis suggests that Azerbaijani mediation is an auxiliary goal demonstrating the nation’s evolving diplomatic ambitions, not a primary security imperative. I conclude that, while Azerbaijan’s historical ties with Türkiye and Israel are valuable, unit-level factors in Türkiye’s foreign policy, particularly its alignment with neo-Ottomanism, and systemic pressures such as disputes over Türkiye’s Blue Homeland naval doctrine in the eastern Mediterranean Sea present challenges to successful mediation. Despite these challenges, this study considers Azerbaijan’s potential transition from a small state to a middle power as it expands its global focus.

Keywords: neoclassical realism, Azerbaijan, Israel, Türkiye, small state

Introduction 

Azerbaijan, located in the South Caucasus, has historically been a peripheral region for various vast empires. To its west was the sphere of influence of the Ottoman Empire, to its south the various Turco-Persian empires, and to the north, Russian dominance. Owing to its geographical proximity to the centers of these empires, the South Caucasus often played a peripheral role, affording the local populace a degree of autonomy in their daily undertakings.

However, due to its strategic position, the region often found itself at the crossroads of imperial interests, leading to significant challenges for its inhabitants. It is conceivable that these historical challenges influenced Azerbaijan’s decision to adopt a balanced foreign policy after securing its independence for the second time in 1991.¹ Rather than aligning with major powers like Russia or the United States, Azerbaijan sought equilibrium between them. This stance, however, did not preclude Azerbaijan from forming alliances; the nation strategically allied with regional middle powers, particularly its ethno-linguistic kin in Türkiye and the geopolitically significant nation of Israel. Notably, during the 1990s and early 2000s, an unofficial entente emerged among Azerbaijan, Israel, and Türkiye.² Over the past decade, however, relations between Türkiye and Israel have deteriorated. With these two primary allies in discord, Azerbaijan found itself navigating a delicate balance between them.

Developments after the Second Karabakh War, which resulted in an Azerbaijani victory thanks to Turkish and Israeli weaponry,³ up until the conflict between Israel and Hamas that followed Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, suggested a potential normalization between Türkiye and Israel, with Azerbaijan frequently mentioned as a possible mediator.⁴ This article delves into the feasibility of Azerbaijan playing a mediating role in Turkish- Israeli relations and explores whether Azerbaijan could revive the previously broached entente between Azerbaijan, Israel, and Türkiye.⁵

The next section of the article underscores Azerbaijan’s significant position vis-à-vis Türkiye and Israel. This pivotal role places Azerbaijan in a unique situation where it could potentially facilitate dialogue between these two regional powers.

Subsequently, the article delves into the dynamics of Turkish-Israeli relations. I observe how unit-level factors, particularly Türkiye’s discernible tilt towards a more neo- Ottomanist foreign policy, play out. This change in Türkiye’s stance introduces systemic pressures, altering the regional balance and its interactions with other states.

I contend that Azerbaijan’s potential mediation between Türkiye and Israel represents an auxiliary objective. It is not a primary security imperative but rather a supplementary goal, showcasing the nation’s evolving diplomatic ambitions.

Understanding Azerbaijan’s Attempt to Mediate between Israel and Türkiye through Neoclassical Realism

This article offers an insight into Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, examined through the lens of neoclassical realism (NCR). NCR, a term coined by Gideon Rose, argues that while systemic pressures such as the competitive nature of international relations are the main factors driving a country’s foreign policy, unit-level factors also play a significant role. These unit-level factors, encompassing the leaders’ perceptions, type of government, strength of the executive branch, public opinion and societal pressures, level of economic development, military strength, historical experiences, and national values and norms, act as the primary filters through which countries perceive and calculate their responses to systemic pressures.6 The NCR approach offers a comprehensive lens through which to analyze a state’s foreign policy. Unlike classical or structural realist theories that focus predominantly on an anarchic international system, NCR introduces unit-level variables that provide a more nuanced understanding of state behavior.⁷ By integrating these variables, it illuminates the complex interplay of systemic forces and state-specific characteristics in driving a state’s external actions. This article will draw on the neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation developed by Nicholas Kitchen.⁸

I concur that leaders make decisions based on their perception of their country’s power relative to others and their understanding of the intentions of other nations. They determine what they believe is in the best interest of their country. However, it is essential to acknowledge that they must also consider domestic issues and constraints. Therefore, the first step in forming a grand strategy is identifying threats to the state’s security.⁹

Since gaining its independence on October 18, 1991, Azerbaijan has sought to avoid becoming a stage for major geopolitical rivals such as the United States and Russia.¹⁰ This perspective significantly influences all of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Another primary concern for Azerbaijan has been the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan has been embroiled in this conflict from the start, at one point losing control over approximately 20% of its territory.¹¹ The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict started in 1988 and lasted until 1994 with the ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia signed in Bishkek on May 5, 1994. As a result of the conflict, around 700,000 Azerbaijanis fled Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent regions.¹² The Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been one of the driving forces behind Azerbaijan’s foreign policy (the other one being the goal of avoiding becoming a geopolitical center of friction).

The second element in grand strategy formation is determining the means to execute this strategy.¹³ To achieve its primary objectives, Azerbaijan leverages two key advantages. First, it capitalizes on its energy resources by forming economic partnerships with the West. This approach counters Russian influence and elevates Azerbaijan’s economic and political significance in the eyes of Western nations.¹⁴ Azerbaijan recognizes Russia’s pivotal role in resolving the conflict, as Russia is the major power in the region and is allied with Armenia in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but it also believes that giving Russia complete control over the issue is not beneficial. Second, Azerbaijan’s strategic geographical position connects Central Asia to Europe. This location makes it the most reliable route for transporting the oil and gas resources of Central Asian states to the West, especially when compared to routes through Iran and Russia.¹⁵

The third element in the neoclassical model of grand strategy formation is to have auxiliary goals. Auxiliary goals can focus on territorial expansion or economic dominance. They might stem from a country’s historical or cultural ties, advocate for ethical standards or political ideologies, or seek to achieve overarching global interests. Decisions as to which of these secondary objectives to prioritize, and the resources allocated for them, emerge from internal discussions within the state, especially after primary systemic needs have been met.¹⁶

The primary objectives of states are to ensure their existence and security. Consequently, the pursuit of auxiliary goals often depends on the availability of resources. Given Azerbaijan’s relatively small size, its decades-long territorial dispute with neighboring Armenia, and its position between two larger countries, Russia and Iran, it might seem that Azerbaijan lacks the capacity to pursue secondary objectives.

While the argument has some merit, restoration of the territorial integrity that resolved one of the country’s primary concerns might enable Azerbaijan to consider auxiliary goals. Following its victory in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 and its successful military operation in the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Azerbaijan not only solidified its sovereignty over its internationally recognized territories but also gained substantial acknowledgment of its military strength.¹⁷ This triumph allowed Azerbaijan to address and possibly settle a long-term foreign policy issue. This has given Azerbaijan the latitude to broaden its focus beyond the South Caucasus.

Given these developments, it is plausible that Azerbaijan may embrace auxiliary objectives. I posit that one such goal could be to mediate relations between Israel and Türkiye. Both nations are allies of Azerbaijan. While Israel hasn’t formalized a military alliance with Azerbaijan, their close collaboration in energy, security, and military matters, coupled with Israel’s sales of advanced military technology to Azerbaijan, suggests an unofficial alliance.¹⁸ In contrast, Türkiye’s alliance with Azerbaijan is well defined, as evidenced by the Shusha Declaration signed on June 15, 2021, which solidifies the two countries’ political and military partnership.¹⁹

In the subsequent sections of this article, I will delve into why I perceive this as an auxiliary goal for Azerbaijan and evaluate the nation’s potential to mediate relations between its two closest allies. I contend that while such mediation undoubtedly benefits Azerbaijan, it is not of paramount significance. Both Israel and Türkiye agree on keeping Azerbaijan distinct from their bilateral dispute, recognizing that Azerbaijan offers significant advantages to each of them.

Methodology

To offer a comprehensive understanding of Azerbaijan’s role in mediating Israeli-Turkish relations, this article employs a multipronged methodological approach. This approach combines insights from peer-reviewed academic literature and official statements. Each of these sources makes valuable contributions to the study, offering unique perspectives and enhancing the depth and breadth of analysis. Additionally, media reports and position papers are incorporated to illustrate specific events and existing trends. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that position papers and media reports are not employed to draw conclusions or establish empirical evidence. These sources are primarily used to demonstrate how Azerbaijan’s mediation role has been discussed by political analysts and commentators or to establish the occurrence of certain political events and statements. Consequently, their conclusions are not treated as substitutes for academic literature or empirical facts. In synthesizing insights from these sources, the article ensures a holistic understanding, bridging the gap between theory and contemporary real-world dynamics. Rigorous cross-referencing was employed to ensure the authenticity of facts and the credibility of interpretations.

Azerbaijan: A Pivotal State for Israel and Türkiye

Since gaining independence, Azerbaijan has been cautious about the potential security implications of being situated between major geopolitical rivals. Historically, it has strived to maintain a neutral stance, avoiding alignment with dominant powers such as Russia and the United States or getting caught between larger alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and CSTO. It is crucial to recognize that for Azerbaijan, the Karabakh conflict and the loss of this region were deeply intertwined with these geopolitical considerations.²⁰

Thus, Azerbaijan adopted a strategy different from those of countries like Georgia and Ukraine, which leaned more towards the West. Instead, Azerbaijan sought to bolster its ties with regional powers such as Türkiye as a main ally and security guarantor and Israel for balance against Iran.

This strategy allowed Azerbaijan to maintain unique relationships with both Israel and Türkiye, having established profound diplomatic, economic, security, and military ties with each. Interestingly, despite the discord between Israel and Türkiye over the past decade, Azerbaijan has skillfully maintained amicable relations with both nations. During this period, neither Israel nor Türkiye pressured Azerbaijan to align with one over the other.²¹ This neutrality can be attributed to Azerbaijan’s status as a “pivotal state” for both nations. The concept of the “pivot” was introduced by Mackinder in his seminal work “The

Geographical Pivot of History” in 1904.²² Mackinder posited that, due to their strategic locations, other states revolve around a pivot state. Over time, this concept evolved to define a pivot state as one possessing strategic military, economic, or ideational assets desired by great powers. Such states are strategically positioned between powerful nations and can leverage their assets to engage with several great powers simultaneously. Any changes in their alignments can have substantial security implications.

Both Türkiye and Israel view Azerbaijan as a reliable trading partner, confident in its commitment to fair market practices in the energy sector. It is pertinent to note that Azerbaijan does not hold a complete monopoly on energy resources. However, although both countries could theoretically seek alternative suppliers in the event of perceived exploitation by Azerbaijan, such a shift would not be readily achievable. The infrastructure necessary to import oil and gas from a new source would require significant investment and time to establish. As such, even without a strict monopoly, Azerbaijan’s energy exports significantly influence the economies of both Türkiye and Israel. It is also worth considering the long-term consequences of manipulating energy supplies. Such actions could damage Azerbaijan’s relationship with these key allies, ultimately hindering its own economic and geopolitical stability. In conclusion, the interdependent nature of the energy relationships between Azerbaijan and both Türkiye and Israel fosters close cooperation and discourages unilateral actions that could jeopardize this mutually beneficial partnership.

Azerbaijan-Israel Relations

Since Azerbaijan gained its independence, Israel has cultivated a close relationship with the nation. Many scholars interpret this bond as primarily security-driven.²³ The strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Israel has emerged as a geopolitical alliance in a complex region marked by historical conflicts and security challenges. In the quest for

stability, security, and economic growth, both nations have recognized the benefits of forging strong ties. Israel’s “periphery doctrine,” a historical strategy aimed at cultivating relationships with non-Arab states on the fringes of the Middle East, has played a pivotal role in shaping its interest in Azerbaijan.²⁴ Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s pragmatic foreign policy approach and pursuit of strategic alliances have driven its engagement with Israel.²⁵ The profound sense of insecurity prevalent in both Israeli and Azerbaijani societies has been identified as a key determinant shaping their foreign policies, so much so that the foreign policy decisions of these nations often appear to be extensions of their national security priorities.²⁶ Bourtman’s proposition that these countries harbor an “insecurity complex” emanates from this very sentiment.²⁷ This is characterized by a perception of being under constant threat from neighboring nations, with the threat potentially jeopardizing their existence.

Prior to the 1979, Iran was a close ally of Israel. Israel’s periphery doctrine envisioned fostering partnerships with non-Arab nations in the Middle East, and Iran fit the bill.²⁸ However, the Islamic Revolution in Iran triggered a radical transformation of the country’s stance towards Israel. The new Islamist regime designated the Jewish state as an “enemy of Islam,” prompting Israel, in turn, to view Iran as a primary existential threat. With its emergence in 1991, Azerbaijan became as an alternative ally for Israel, offering a counterbalance to Iran.²⁹

The Iran dynamic has conspicuously emerged as a cornerstone of the Azerbaijan-Israel partnership. Iran’s adversarial stance towards Israel and its somewhat fractious relationship with Azerbaijan, especially in relation to territorial disputes and shared ethnic ties with the Azeri population of Iran, have intensified discord between the two neighbors.³⁰ For Iran, the idea of a sovereign Azerbaijan poses palpable threats to its territorial cohesion and national unity. The latent aspirations of the Azeri population in Iran (which is the largest minority, constituting about a fourth of Iran’s populace) to potentially secede and forge a “Greater Azerbaijan”³¹ forms a central friction point in Azerbaijan’s engagements with Iran. Certainly, the partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan is largely driven by their shared concerns about Iran. While economic ties are important, their main goal is to counter Iran’s influence in the region. This common goal strongly defines their relationship. There have been speculations that Azerbaijan permits Israeli aircraft to utilize its airfields and airspace for operations concerning Iran. Additionally, there are indications of cooperation between Azerbaijani and Israeli intelligence agencies for operations within Iran.³² Media reports have also highlighted that Israel supplied Azerbaijan with the advanced Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile system.³³ Israel’s rationale is centered on the capability of intercepting Iranian ballistic missiles during their ascent. Once a ballistic missile reaches space, its warhead detaches and speeds towards the target, making interception at this stage nearly impossible. Thus, neutralizing the missile before warhead detachment is imperative. Given Israel’s remote geographical position, achieving this interception becomes challenging, whereas Azerbaijan’s proximity to Iran offers an ideal location for such operations.

Lastly, the economic and energy sectors cannot be disregarded when discussing Azerbaijani-Israeli relations. Israel has perennially sought “’energy security” since its inception. Given the paucity of energy reserves in Israel, the nation’s ties with energy- rich Azerbaijan assume paramount significance.³⁴ Göksel explored Azerbaijan’s rising significance as an energy producer, especially as an alternative to Iran following international sanctions on Iran.³⁵ Currently, Azerbaijan meets 40% of Israel’s energy requirements.³⁶

Azerbaijan-Türkiye Relations

The relationship between Azerbaijan and Türkiye is underpinned by profound historical, cultural, and ethnic connections, further enriched by shared modern-day interests. Türkiye’s support for Azerbaijan, evident during the national struggle for independence and continuing steadfastly after Azerbaijani independence in 1991, has deepened their ties. A clear indication of this strong bond was Türkiye’s immediate acknowledgment of Azerbaijan’s independence on November 9, 1991. In the subsequent years, a multitude of agreements spanning areas such as the economy, trade, education, culture, and science have been established.³⁷

Economic dynamics, with a notable emphasis on the energy domain, play a crucial role. Following Azerbaijan’s independence, there was a surge of foreign investments in its energy sector, leading to increased production. Presently, oil and gas exploration are central to Azerbaijan’s economy. The nation depends significantly on Türkiye to distribute its energy resources globally, providing a counterbalance to Russian influences. Türkiye, in turn, capitalizes on Azerbaijan to bolster its energy reliability and enhance its geopolitical standing.³⁸ For Türkiye, Azerbaijan’s abundant energy resources are vital. The Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan oil pipeline was established in June 2006, bypassing Armenia to transport oil to global markets. By 2017, it had transported 2.87 billion barrels of oil, which were exported through 3,758 tankers departing from the Ceyhan port. As of the first quarter of 2020, the cumulative volume of crude oil dispatched to worldwide markets had reached 3.41 billion barrels, equivalent to over 455 million tons loaded onto 4,457 tankers.³⁹ Significantly, while Russia remains Türkiye’s primary energy supplier, Azerbaijan holds an important position as Türkiye seeks to diversify its energy sources.⁴⁰

Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s oil and gas transit through Türkiye, emphasizing the latter’s role as an essential energy hub.⁴¹ Türkiye, therefore, places a premium on maintaining strong ties with Azerbaijan. Moreover, Azerbaijan acts as a bridge for Türkiye to the Turkic world, connecting Türkiye to Central Asian Turkic nations. Historically, Azerbaijan maintained its ties with Central Asia during the Soviet era, as both regions were part of the Soviet Union. Thus, Azerbaijan possesses a deeper understanding of the internal dynamics and elite mentalities in these countries. Without Azerbaijan’s bridging role, Türkiye’s engagement with Central Asian nations would be challenging and perhaps meaningless.

The peak of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations has been the Shusha Declaration, formally recognized as the agreement on the alliance between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Türkiye. This significant accord was signed on June 15, 2021, by President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Türkiye during a two- day official visit by Erdoğan to Azerbaijan. The extensive declaration covers a myriad of areas including political, economic, cultural, educational, and sporting ties. It also addresses energy security and emphasizes defense industry cooperation and mutual military aid.⁴²

In summary, Azerbaijan plays a pivotal role for both Türkiye and Israel. This cooperation suggests that Azerbaijan, even in the absence of Turkish-Israeli normalization, can benefit from its alliances. It might even be positioned to encourage further collaboration between these two nations, aligning with Azerbaijan’s broader interests.

Systemic Tension between Türkiye and Israel as a Barrier to Azerbaijani Mediation

In the 1990s, Turkish-Israeli relations flourished due to factors such as the Middle East peace process, the improvement of Turkish-US relations, and Türkiye’s search for allies against Iran and Syria. Those countries were seen as threats, especially as they supported the PKK. The common threat faced by both nations shifted from the dangers of Communism and pan-Arabism during the Cold War to radical Islam in the 1990s.⁴³

Türkiye’s approach to Israel during this period was also seen as a counterbalance to the rising influence of the Islamist Welfare Party in Türkiye. The military establishment in Türkiye viewed Israel as a democratic, secular ally in the Middle East.⁴⁴

During this decade, Türkiye and Israel signed various military cooperation and free trade agreements. Trade between the two nations grew exponentially, reaching $2 billion by 2004. They inked over twenty military-related agreements, with the Military Training and Cooperation Agreement of 1996 being particularly notable. These pacts covered aspects from military training to the modernization of fighter jets.⁴⁵

During the early years of Erdoğan’s leadership in Türkiye, there was only limited change to Turkish-Israeli relations. However, the trajectory of the Turkish-Israeli relationship began to shift noticeably following Erdoğan’s vocal criticisms of Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War, which coincided with a heightened pro-Palestinian stance, though the discord was mainly rhetorical, as military agreements persisted. Additionally, Türkiye’s welcoming attitude towards Hamas after their 2006 election win and growing relations with Iran and Syria were seen as shifts in its foreign policy.⁴⁶

The significant transformation in unit-level factors within Türkiye occurred as the country transitioned from a secular, pro-Western orientation to a more religious and neo-Ottomanist direction. Consequently, Israel interpreted Türkiye’s shift in foreign policy as a pivot towards Muslim-majority nations, with certain commentators characterizing it as an “Islamization” of Türkiye. The relationship suffered significant blows with Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008 and the “Davos incident” in 2009, where Erdoğan publicly criticized Israel.⁴⁷

The most notable rupture in relations was over the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, where Israeli forces intercepted a flotilla heading to Gaza, resulting in the death of nine Turkish citizens. The incident led to a severe breakdown in diplomatic relations. Although tensions eased somewhat after an Israeli apology in 2013 and a compensation deal in 2016, the relationship remained fragile.⁴⁸

As Turkish-Israeli relations faltered, Greece saw an opportunity to strengthen its ties with Israel, capitalizing on the diplomatic vacuum.⁴⁹ Between 2009 and 2012, Greece and Israel experienced a noteworthy increase in cooperation, encompassing military, economic, and civilian domains.

This renewed partnership was initiated in 2009 with a meeting between Benjamin Netanyahu and George Papandreou. A driving factor behind this strengthened alliance was the deteriorating relationship between Türkiye and Israel.⁵⁰ Both Greece and Israel were motivated by a desire to maintain a balance of threat and to further their respective national interests. Greek-Israeli rapprochement led to the formation of the strategic partnership between Greece, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), and Israel in the eastern Mediterranean Sea (EMS).⁵¹

During the 2000s, a wave of bilateral Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation agreements were signed among Mediterranean states, primarily in the hope of tapping into potential hydrocarbon exploration. Leading the charge was the RoC. In 2003, the RoC established a pioneering legal framework by inking an EEZ agreement with Egypt. This proactive move was solidified further in 2004, when Nicosia unilaterally legislated the designation of its EEZ. The RoC continued the momentum in 2007 by signing an EEZ accord with Lebanon.⁵² However, this move did not go unnoticed; it stirred discontent in Ankara. Due to Türkiye’s influence, the agreement with Lebanon has not yet been ratified by the Lebanese parliament.⁵³

These actions were not mere economic ventures; they had profound geopolitical implications. The discovery of significant Israeli and Cypriot offshore natural gas reserves, coupled with strained Turkish-Israeli relations, has recalibrated strategic balances. This was further underscored when the RoC and Israel formalized their cooperation through an EEZ agreement in December 2010.⁵⁴

Greece astutely navigated these geopolitical shifts. Capitalizing on the fissures in Turkish-Israeli relations, Greece fostered a rapprochement with Israel. This strategy bore fruit in less than half a decade, leading to a robust security partnership between these two eastern Mediterranean nations.⁵⁵

Türkiye worries that changes in boundaries in the Mediterranean might negatively impact its standing in the Aegean Sea, where disagreements with Greece already exist. For many years, disputes over maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean were primarily local issues, involving disagreements among Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye regarding territorial claims. However, in the last decade, the region’s offshore natural gas reserves have transformed the eastern Mediterranean into a strategically important area.

As we can clearly see, Israel’s partnership with the RoC and Greece is a hindrance for normalization of Israeli-Turkish relations. Türkiye views recent developments in the EMS not just as potentially harmful to its economic interests but as a direct threat to its security. If Greece increases its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea from 6 miles to 12 miles, it will practically turn the Aegean Sea into a Greek lake, thus cutting off Türkiye’s economic core in the Marmara region from direct access to the world’s oceans.⁵⁶

Thus, we can deduce that significant changes in domestic factors within Türkiye led to systemic tensions between Israel and Türkiye. While Türkiye and Israel do not have a direct conflict in the EMS, the divergence in their views on the Palestinian issue and the mutual mistrust arising from these differing perspectives have acted as barriers preventing Türkiye and Israel from entering into an EEZ agreement.

The Possibility of Azerbaijan Mediating Turkish-Israeli Relations 

Having addressed its primary geopolitical challenges – restoring its territorial integrity and maintaining a balance between Russia and the United States – Azerbaijan can potentially focus on secondary objectives and become more proactive in its relations with Israel and Türkiye. With this backdrop, Azerbaijan can feel relatively at ease regarding these relations and pursue auxiliary goals. An auxiliary goal is generally pursued once primary objectives have been achieved or are on track.⁵⁷

An example of such an auxiliary goal could be mediating the historically tense relations between Türkiye and Israel. Notably, neither Türkiye nor Israel has pressured Azerbaijan to choose sides despite their strained relations.⁵⁸ Azerbaijan possesses several characteristics that initially made it a promising mediator. First, Azerbaijan shares strategic interests with both countries, particularly regarding regional security. Second, Azerbaijan’s growing economic and military ties with both Israel and Türkiye create a foundation for trilateral cooperation.

The potential catalyst for mediation emerged from the Second Karabakh War, which could have facilitated an improvement in Israeli-Turkish relations. Prior to the war, relations between the two countries had deteriorated considerably over the previous decade, with several diplomatic clashes and the absence of formal diplomatic ties since 2010. Despite the strained political relationship, economic ties remained robust, with significant trade volumes highlighting the potential for cooperation even amidst political tension.⁵⁹ Notably, neither Israel nor Türkiye had expressed any noteworthy interest in normalizing relations during this period. However, the shared strategic interests exposed by the Second Karabakh War created an impetus for rapprochement, as Israel and Türkiye, despite their differences, both supported Azerbaijan.⁶⁰ For instance, aircraft transporting arms from Israel to Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War, were permitted to cross through Turkish airspace.⁶¹ During the conflict, Azerbaijan integrated both Israeli and Turkish equipment, effectively employing Israeli and Turkish drones and missile systems in tandem.⁶² This suggests a level of coordination or at least tacit agreement between Israeli and Turkish authorities.

Since the Second Karabakh War, both Israel and Türkiye have embarked on a journey towards the normalization of their diplomatic ties. The attempt to normalize relations commenced in the latter part of 2020, with a substantial milestone being the mutual agreement to reinstate their ambassadors.⁶³

On March 9, 2022, a pivotal summit was convened in Ankara, Türkiye, featuring Israeli President Isaac Herzog and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.⁶⁴ This event underscored the two countries’ mutual commitment as both proclaimed the restoration of full diplomatic ties and the reassignment of their ambassadors in Ankara and Tel Aviv.

As a result of the aforementioned developments, Azerbaijan has emerged as a potential mediator in the diplomatic realm between Türkiye and Israel. Leading this mediation initiative is Hikmat Hajiyev, assistant to the President of Azerbaijan and head of the Foreign Policy Affairs Department of the Presidential Administration. Through various interactions with Israeli media outlets, Hajiyev has underscored Azerbaijan’s interest in nurturing trilateral cooperation among the three nations.⁶⁵ In an interview with the Israeli TV channel i24NEWS in 2023, Hajiyev articulated Azerbaijan’s aspiration for friendship and mutual understanding between Türkiye and Israel. His statement, “We would like our friends to be friends among themselves,” reflects a diplomatic aspiration aimed at regional stability and stronger ties between the nations.⁶⁶

The proposed trilateral format is perceived as a mechanism for improving communication and potentially addressing longstanding disputes between Türkiye and Israel. Through these diplomatic gestures, Azerbaijan is not only positioning itself as a mediator but is also seeking to establish a new framework for regional cooperation. Furthermore, Hajiyev’s emphasis on enhancing communication in a trilateral format underscores Azerbaijan’s satisfaction with the progression of diplomatic relations and its aspiration for a more cohesive regional discourse.⁶⁷

However, one of the main obstacles to improving relations between Türkiye and Israel centers around the issues in the EMS. The EMS has emerged as a focal point of geopolitical and energy-related tensions, predominantly surrounding the EEZ, as some of the same areas are claimed by both Greece and Türkiye.⁶⁸ Although Türkiye and Israel are not in direct confrontation, trilateral partnership among Israel, Greece, and the RoC puts Israel and Türkiye on opposite sides of the geopolitical rivalry. Türkiye’s primary competitors, Greece and the RoC, are closely aligned with Israel in this dispute over the EEZ.⁶⁹

The current strategic partnership among Israel, Greece, and the RoC in the EMS can be traced back to a significant shift in Turkish foreign policy. A rise in pro-Islamic sentiment and the pursuit of neo-Ottomanist ambitions by Türkiye likely prompted Israel to forge closer ties with Greece and the RoC as a counterbalance. This dynamic highlights the enduring influence of regional power politics on alignments within the eastern Mediterranean. While a hypothetical change in Turkish policy on the Palestinian issue might create conditions for improved relations with Israel, it is unlikely to dismantle the established trilateral partnership among Israel, Greece, and the RoC. These nations have developed a robust network of economic and security cooperation that transcends the immediate tensions with Türkiye. Dismantling such a well-established partnership would be a complex undertaking, suggesting that the strategic landscape of the eastern Mediterranean has been permanently altered by past Turkish foreign policy choices.

Indeed, Türkiye’s current “Blue Homeland” doctrine presents potentially more favorable conditions for Israel than the EEZ agreement with the RoC. Were Israel to reach an EEZ agreement with Türkiye, it would substantially expand its maritime territory within the EMS.⁷⁰ However, such a pact remains unattainable. The realization of such an agreement would inevitably encroach upon the sovereign rights of the RoC, an EU member state. Considering Israel’s array of geopolitical adversaries, it is unlikely to jeopardize its strategic relations with an EU nation for the sake of a precarious normalization with Türkiye. It is not realistic to expect Azerbaijan, despite its growing ties with both Israel and Türkiye, to possess the political capital or leverage necessary to significantly alter this dynamic.

Furthermore, despite the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, which witnessed normalization attempts between Türkiye and Israel, conflict between Israel and Hamas due to Hamas’s attack on Israeli soil on October 7, 2023, has seemingly hampered the ongoing normalization process between the two nations.

The Israeli military response to Hamas’s surprise attack from Gaza has had substantial consequences in the Muslim world, drawing attention from countries with Muslim majorities including Azerbaijan, despite its secular disposition. Azerbaijan faces a diplomatic challenge due to its proximity to influential neighbors, Iran and Türkiye, both of which strongly support the Palestinian cause. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel have peaked, requiring careful navigation on the global stage.

While maneuvering through complex diplomatic landscapes, Azerbaijan has adopted a nuanced position. Like Türkiye, Azerbaijan initially condemned violence against civilians in the conflict zone and expressed condolences for both Palestinian and Israeli losses.⁷¹ This stance was maintained during the United Nations General Assembly session on October 27, where Azerbaijan backed a resolution calling for an immediate halt to hostilities in the Israeli offensive against Gaza. ⁷²

Amid increasing demands from the Islamic world to condemn Israel and support a ceasefire, Azerbaijan has opted for a cautious approach aligned with its strategic interests. Following recent successes in Karabakh, Azerbaijan seems inclined to strengthen its relations with Israel discreetly, while steering clear of getting involved in the geopolitical maneuvers of major powers. An indication of this inclination is that SOCAR, the Azerbaijani state oil company, obtained a gas exploration license for offshore blocks in the EMS.⁷³

Furthermore, Azerbaijan might face challenges in its diplomatic efforts to balance its alliance with Türkiye and its growing relations with Israel. These challenges are made more complex by Türkiye’s increasingly hostile stance towards Israel, exemplified by President Erdoğan’s labelling of Israel as a “terrorist state” and his expressions of support for Hamas. His speech in which he condemned Israel, supported Hamas, did not recognize Hamas as a terror organization, and referred to Hamas fighters as mujahideen defending their homes has likely derailed this normalization process. With Erdoğan also stating that he will cancel his planned visit to Israel, it is reasonable to conclude that Israeli-Turkish normalization is off the table for now. Türkiye’s commitment to support the Palestinian cause stems from the Islamist background of the incumbent AKP party and President Erdoğan. It is highly unlikely that Azerbaijan can change this dynamic in Turkish politics. A significant portion of the Turkish public also supports the Palestinian cause, ensuring that the unit-level factor will remain an obstacle.

Despite Azerbaijan’s ideal position as a mediator, it seems unable to mend the current rift between Türkiye and Israel. Azerbaijan will remain a possible mediator between the two nations, and it is highly unlikely that the recent disruptions of the normalization process will affect Azerbaijan’s stance; nevertheless, it is not feasible for Azerbaijan to be able to establish the previously discussed entente among the three nations.⁷⁴

Conclusion

This analysis has explored the potential for Azerbaijan to act as a mediator in normalizing relations between Türkiye and Israel. While initial conditions following the Second Karabakh War appeared promising, the recent escalation between Israel and Hamas, coupled with Türkiye’s unwavering support for the Palestinian cause, has significantly hampered progress. The most immediate hurdle is the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The current Gaza conflict reignited tensions across the Muslim world, placing Azerbaijan in a precarious position. Its strategic partnerships with both Israel and Türkiye necessitate a delicate balancing act. Azerbaijan’s cautious approach, advocating for civilian safety while avoiding condemnation of Israel, highlights the complexities of navigating this volatile geopolitical landscape.

Furthermore, systemic pressures stemming from the eastern Mediterranean dispute pose a significant challenge. Although an EEZ agreement between Türkiye and Israel could be mutually beneficial, achieving it would require dismantling the established trilateral partnership among Israel, Greece, and the RoC. Azerbaijan’s leverage in this situation is limited. Convincing Israel to sever ties with key regional partners, especially amidst strained relations with Türkiye, appears improbable.

The success of Azerbaijan’s mediation hinges on a crucial factor: the willingness of Türkiye and Israel to prioritize regional cooperation over ideological differences. Azerbaijan’s growing role in regional diplomacy and its ability to maintain strong ties with both parties position it to play a constructive role if such a shift occurs.

In conclusion, the dream of a trilateral entente among Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Israel appears to be fading in the current climate. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the eastern Mediterranean dispute continue to cast long shadows. However, Azerbaijan’s potential as a mediator remains, contingent on a future in which both Türkiye and Israel prioritize regional stability and pragmatic cooperation over entrenched ideological positions.

Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s efforts raise an intriguing question: Is Azerbaijan, as it pursues auxiliary goals and expands its focus beyond the South Caucasus region, transitioning from a small state to a middle power? Although it is presently categorized as a small state, such entities typically lack the ability to achieve auxiliary goals or mediate between regional powers. This raises the possibility of conducting further research into Azerbaijan’s potential evolution from a small state to a middle power.

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