Ankara Falls Behind Paris: A New Geopolitical Rivalry in Central Asia

Central Asia is becoming a new front in the geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Europe. The recent OTS summit in Bishkek highlighted tensions over Northern Cyprus, with Ankara pushing for inclusion and Central Asian states leaning toward EU positions. France’s growing role and EU investments challenge Turkey’s traditional dominance in the Turkic world.

Caspian - Alpine Team
Caspian - Alpine Team
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Emmanuel Macron during a working dinner in Istanbul, 2018. Photo (cropped): Kremlin.ru | CC BY 4.0

In recent years, Central Asia has become a growing arena of geopolitical rivalry between global and regional powers. Turkey, which has long played a significant role in the region—culturally, politically, and economically—is now facing the challenge of increasing European influence, led by France and supported by EU institutions.

A turning point came at the 11th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), held in Bishkek in November 2024. One of the most notable episodes was the invitation of Ersin Tatar, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), as an “honorary guest.” Until then, Central Asian states had refrained from official contact with the unrecognized entity within the OTS framework.

The situation gained even more intrigue when it was revealed that the invitation followed shortly after Turkey wrote off Kyrgyzstan’s $62 million debt. This was interpreted as a diplomatic move to strengthen TRNC’s presence in the Turkic space. However, Ankara’s efforts were met with a reserved, and at times openly critical, response from other OTS members.

In early 2025, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan appointed ambassadors to the Republic of Cyprus (the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government). This coincided with the EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand, where the final declaration included references to UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550—documents that explicitly reject the legitimacy of the TRNC and reaffirm the Republic of Cyprus as the sole lawful authority on the island.

Although the TRNC was not mentioned by name in the Samarkand communiqué, the emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity, along with the references to these UN resolutions, was perceived as a political signal. These formulations, together with the EU’s announced €12 billion investment package for Central Asia, underscored Brussels’ determination to consolidate its influence in the region.

According to analysts, these developments reflect not a spontaneous reaction but rather the result of targeted European lobbying—particularly by Cyprus. Within the EU’s consensus-based system, the position of a single member state can quickly evolve into a common European stance.

One of the first to highlight this shift in diplomatic tone was the Azerbaijani analytical Telegram channel Şərqə baxış (“A View to the East”), which noted that France is using the Cyprus issue as a tool to pressure Turkey within Turkic institutional structures. According to the authors, this is not so much a legal maneuver as a geopolitical tactic aimed at strengthening European leverage at a time when Ankara’s influence appears to be waning.

Some experts, including those from the South Caucasus Research Center (CQTM, Baku), believe that the Central Asian states could have chosen a more balanced approach—refraining from mentioning the resolutions while still limiting TRNC’s participation in the summit. Such a path would have preserved a degree of neutrality between the EU and Turkey. However, the choice made clearly signals a deliberate alignment with Brussels.

Meanwhile, Turkey remains consistent in defending TRNC’s interests within the OTS. At the Bishkek Summit, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated: “A just solution for the Turkish Cypriots is the responsibility of the Turkic world.” Azerbaijan echoed this position, calling for the TRNC to be granted full membership in the organization.

Central Asian caution can be explained by the realities of regional politics. Recognizing the TRNC, which is considered illegitimate under international law, could create an undesirable precedent in a region where unresolved conflicts—such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia—still persist.

Nonetheless, observers are confident that Turkey and Azerbaijan will not abandon their support for the TRNC. They recall that in 2004, it was the Turkish Cypriots who accepted the UN-backed Annan Plan for reunification of the island, while the Greek Cypriots rejected it. Yet it was the Republic of Cyprus that was admitted into the EU—a fact widely viewed in the Turkic world as a case of political hypocrisy and discrimination against Muslim communities.

The unfolding events have also cast doubt on the internal cohesion of the OTS. Although Turkey has traditionally played a leading role, the reactions of other member states demonstrate that the organization is a union of sovereign equals rather than a tool of regional dominance.

In this context, Azerbaijan could play a key stabilizing role. With close ties to both Turkey and the Central Asian republics, Baku is well-positioned to act as a mediator. Moreover, the next OTS summit is scheduled to take place in Azerbaijan, providing an opportunity to formulate a shared position on sensitive issues such as TRNC participation.

In the long term, the Cyprus question may once again fade into the background—at least until the structure of the international system changes. However, it has already revealed deeper contradictions and demonstrated how quickly the balance of power in Central Asia can shift.

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