Since their signing in 2020 under the auspices of then-U.S. President Donald Trump, the Abraham Accords have come to symbolize a new era in Middle Eastern diplomacy. These agreements not only normalized relations between Israel and four Arab states—the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan—but also reflected a deeper strategic shift grounded in shared interests across security, technology, and energy, particularly in the context of countering Iranian influence.
By 2025, attention is increasingly turning eastward. Among diplomats and analysts alike, the idea of expanding the Abraham Accords beyond the traditional Arab world—to include the South Caucasus and Central Asia—is gaining traction. In this context, Azerbaijan emerges as the most logical candidate. Its potential inclusion is now viewed less as a question of “if” and more as a matter of timing and conditions.
For decades, Azerbaijan has maintained strong and consistent ties with Israel. Their partnership spans multiple sectors—from energy to defense. Israel is a key supplier of advanced military technology to Azerbaijan, while Baku remains one of Israel’s primary oil providers. These relations are grounded in pragmatism, secular governance, and overlapping strategic priorities. In a region where most Muslim-majority countries still withhold diplomatic recognition of Israel, Azerbaijan stands out as an open and cooperative partner.
Beyond bilateral relations, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy reflects a broader multivector approach. The country maintains active engagement with the West and the Islamic world, all while avoiding involvement in radical or pan-Islamist projects. Its secular and pragmatic governance model aligns well with the ethos of the Abraham Accords—regional integration, economic development, tolerance, and security.
However, any formal move toward inclusion must take into account the complex geopolitical landscape of the region. A key factor here is the ongoing normalization process between Azerbaijan and Armenia. At first glance, this may seem unrelated to Middle Eastern diplomacy, but within the framework of the Abraham Accords, it is highly relevant. The core logic of the Accords—reconciliation, stability, and economic cooperation—implies that a candidate country must show a genuine commitment to resolving its own regional disputes.
Should Baku successfully conclude peace talks with Yerevan, it would enhance its credibility as a stabilizing force in the South Caucasus. This, in turn, would increase its appeal as a reliable and constructive player in the broader regional context. Moreover, Armenia’s growing estrangement from Russia and its efforts to build closer ties with the West may eventually lead it to explore normalization with Israel—bringing an additional layer of complexity and opportunity to the regional puzzle.
Nevertheless, no regional initiative can ignore the ongoing crisis in Gaza. Since the renewed outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hamas in 2023, many Muslim-majority countries have either paused or reversed normalization efforts, citing the humanitarian toll and the absence of progress on Palestinian statehood.
This applies to Azerbaijan as well. Despite its strategic ties with Israel, Azerbaijani society is deeply sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, shaped in part by the country’s own experience with territorial conflict and displacement. Any move toward formal normalization must therefore be carefully managed. Unless Israel takes visible steps to reduce civilian suffering in Gaza, adhere to international humanitarian norms, and re-engage diplomatically with the Palestinian leadership, Azerbaijani policymakers may face domestic and regional backlash.
That said, the strategic benefits of Azerbaijan joining the Abraham Accords remain substantial. They include access to diversified investment from Israel and Gulf countries in sectors such as renewable energy and agritech; deepened security cooperation in intelligence, defense systems, and cyber operations; increased diplomatic leverage in the South Caucasus; and greater energy integration, including green electricity exports to Israel via Türkiye or regional corridors.
Participation in the Abraham Accords would also give Azerbaijan a meaningful platform to speak on broader regional issues—including Gaza—balancing pragmatism with moral clarity.
In essence, Azerbaijan’s potential accession could symbolize a new chapter in modern diplomacy—one that is not built on static alliances but on dynamic, interest-driven cooperation. If approached with strategic foresight and sensitivity to public sentiment, Azerbaijan’s inclusion may serve as a bridge not only between the Islamic world and Israel, but also between the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia.
In a time when the region seeks new stability mechanisms and cross-regional connectivity, Azerbaijan is uniquely placed to help shape a future in which peace, prosperity, and pragmatic statecraft reinforce one another.
