In recent years, Azerbaijan has steadily strengthened its international political standing, evolving from a traditional regional actor into an important mediator between opposing sides in global and regional politics. This transformation is driven not only by the country’s resource potential and its growing role as a transport and logistics hub, but also by a deliberate diplomatic strategy aimed at balancing interests and reducing conflict potential within complex inter-state configurations.
The surge of diplomatic activity in May 2025, marked by visits to Baku from high-ranking officials of states engaged in intense geopolitical confrontations, reflects Azerbaijan’s emerging role in the regional system of international relations. These include the planned visits of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (subsequently postponed), and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Despite their formal lack of coordination, these visits represent elements of a systemic diplomatic strategy in which Baku functions as a platform for political dialogue. Pezeshkian’s visit took place against the backdrop of internal instability in Iran but still managed to yield a substantive bilateral agenda. Particular attention was paid to the development of transport infrastructure (the North-South Corridor, the Rasht-Astara railway line, and the “Araz Corridor” project through Iranian territory), as well as to fostering more pragmatic bilateral relations.
Significantly, during the visit, Pezeshkian made statements previously uncharacteristic of Tehran’s official rhetoric. Notably, he unequivocally acknowledged Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan—an assertion that provoked a negative reaction in Armenia. This indicates Iran’s willingness to adjust its foreign policy priorities in response to the changed geopolitical landscape following the Second Karabakh War. Furthermore, Pezeshkian’s emphasis on ethnic and cultural ties with Iran’s Azerbaijani population in his public remarks can be seen as an element of soft diplomacy aimed at deepening cooperation with Baku.
Meanwhile, the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, originally scheduled for May 7, was postponed due to escalating tensions in Gaza and Syria and the need to reallocate security resources domestically. However, the postponement did not diminish the importance of the visit. On the contrary, its agenda has gained additional relevance amid growing Iranian-Israeli tensions. According to Israeli media, the planned discussions in Baku included the possibility of Azerbaijani mediation in Turkish-Israeli relations, as well as the potential inclusion of Azerbaijan within the framework of the “Abraham Accords.”
These accords are diplomatic agreements between Israel and several Arab states, brokered by the Trump administration in 2020–2021. As part of the accords, Israel agreed to suspend annexation of the West Bank in exchange for normalized relations with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. Although the implementation of the accords has slowed under the Biden administration, the idea of expanding them remains a topic of discussion among experts and diplomats.
Azerbaijan’s involvement in these mechanisms, even in a consultative role, would represent a potential shift in the regional balance of power—further legitimizing Baku’s mediating role and strengthening its ties with the West. This is particularly relevant in light of the antagonistic relations among Iran, Israel, and Turkey.
It is important to emphasize that Azerbaijan currently demonstrates the capacity to maintain stable and mutually beneficial relations with countries that are in conflict with each other. Its cooperation with Israel is systematic and extends beyond political dialogue to include energy and military collaboration. In turn, Israel views Baku as a strategic partner in the region, especially in matters of security.
Thus, Azerbaijan objectively finds itself positioned as a mediator among major regional powers. Given the leading role of the United States in ensuring Israel’s security and Washington’s strategic interests in the region, the formation of a trilateral cooperation format—Baku–Tel Aviv–Washington—cannot be ruled out. A sign of this was seen in Donald Trump’s congratulatory message to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on the occasion of Novruz, in which he expressed gratitude for Azerbaijan’s support of Israel.
Additional interest surrounds the possible coordination of President Erdoğan’s upcoming visit to Azerbaijan with a potential trip to the United States. Erdoğan himself has stated his intention to meet with Trump “at the earliest opportunity,” emphasizing the importance of this meeting for strengthening Ankara-Washington relations. Against this backdrop, Erdoğan’s criticism of Israel takes on added significance in the context of American mediation and the potential involvement of Baku in normalizing Turkish-Israeli relations.
The ongoing flow of high-level visits to Baku points to a systemic shift in the configuration of regional relationships. Meanwhile, Armenia—traditionally striving to maintain close ties with both Iran and the West—finds itself increasingly isolated from key negotiation processes. Armenian analytical sources note a weakening of Yerevan’s position and express concern about Iran’s growing engagement with Azerbaijan. They also stress that Armenia cannot realistically claim a mediating role, partly due to a lack of trust from Israel.
In this light, Azerbaijan emerges as one of the key centers of regional influence—not only by virtue of its resources and geographic advantages, but also through its ability to engage constructively with states divided by deep-rooted conflicts. This trend underscores the relevance of the “smart diplomacy” concept, under which Baku is cultivating the image of a responsible and reliable partner on the international stage.
