Amid growing geopolitical turbulence, Azerbaijan’s strategic importance to the West is becoming increasingly evident. Michael Scott Doran, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, underscores this point in his recent article published in The Wall Street Journal, where he argues that Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned to help contain Russia, Iran, and China.
According to Doran, Azerbaijan’s geopolitical distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is the only country in the world that borders both Russia and Iran, while successfully resisting the political and military dominance of either. He emphasizes that without an independent and sovereign Azerbaijan, the Middle Corridor—currently the only overland route from Central Asia to Europe not under Moscow’s or Tehran’s control—would not exist. Nor would the Southern Gas Corridor, a U.S.-backed initiative that supplies energy to America’s NATO allies and contributes to the diversification of European gas imports.
In this context, Azerbaijan emerges not merely as a regional actor, but as a pivotal component of the broader architecture of Eurasian security and energy resilience. Its very autonomy, Doran asserts, acts as a bulwark against Russian expansionism, deters Iranian aggression, and limits Chinese influence by ensuring the viability of alternative routes and partnerships in the region.
Doran also cites his February meetings in Jerusalem with high-level Israeli officials, who acknowledged Azerbaijan’s critical role during Israel’s conflict with Hamas. Moreover, they highlighted that Azerbaijan’s Jewish community enjoys greater security and integration than many of its counterparts in Europe.
Yet, such assessments require a more nuanced contextualization. Azerbaijan has long supported a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—advocating for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, alongside Israel. At the same time, the Azerbaijani government maintains an uncompromising stance against terrorism and the targeting of civilians. The country’s own experience with violence and regional instability has instilled a deep understanding of the costs of armed conflict.
The very fact that Azerbaijan’s role is being discussed in one of the United States’ leading newspapers signals growing awareness in Washington of Baku’s strategic value. The reasons are manifold: rich energy reserves, an independent export infrastructure, and a rare geopolitical gateway to Central Asia that operates beyond the control of Russia, Iran, or China.
Nevertheless, a critical question remains: what form of partnership is actually being proposed between Azerbaijan and the United States? The two countries have a long and diverse history of cooperation—ranging from energy and counterterrorism to humanitarian efforts. However, much of this collaboration has eroded under the current U.S. administration, which in Azerbaijan is widely viewed as the most pro-Armenian in recent memory. In light of this, there is cautious optimism in Baku that a return of Donald Trump to the White House could restore bilateral relations to their previous level. Doran’s article, in this regard, appears to align with such hopes. Yet, it is unclear whether the proposal entails balanced bilateral cooperation—or whether it is, in fact, a call to join a coalition directed simultaneously against Russia, Iran, and China.
At this point, it is essential to recall Azerbaijan’s long-standing foreign policy principles. The country has consistently pursued constructive, neighborly relations with its bordering states. While geopolitical frictions are often shaped by factors beyond Baku’s control, Azerbaijan has remained firmly committed to a multi-vector and pragmatic foreign policy. It has never participated in explicitly anti-Russian or anti-Iranian initiatives. Until recently, China had not been considered a primary actor in the South Caucasus, but bilateral relations with Beijing have been steadily deepening, particularly within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Should Azerbaijan now jeopardize these ties in favor of uncertain Western overtures?
While one might speculate that participation in a new Western project could yield certain advantages, such thinking belongs to a bygone era. In the early 1990s, expectations of Western solidarity were high. Today, however, the sobering outcomes of Western engagement in countries such as Georgia and Ukraine provide ample cause for caution. Furthermore, historical precedent reveals that the United States has, on multiple occasions, abandoned its allies when it became expedient to do so. Azerbaijan, too, has its own institutional memory—particularly regarding the U.S. manipulation of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which was waived when Washington needed Baku’s support in Afghanistan, only to be reinstated once that support was no longer necessary.
Given this backdrop, Azerbaijan is likely to adopt a measured and observant posture regarding the proposals outlined in The Wall Street Journal. Key questions remain unanswered: What exactly will Washington offer? What guarantees will be extended, and under what conditions? Any substantive shift in Azerbaijani foreign policy will depend on the clarity and credibility of the answers provided. Hasty engagement in another geopolitical gamble in the hope of symbolic recognition from Western capitals does not align with the principles or strategic calculations that have long guided Azerbaijan’s external affairs.
