One of the key characteristics of Armenia’s post-war foreign policy strategy lies in its selective approach to peace negotiations — emphasizing certain aspects while deliberately avoiding others. This tactic has become a recurring element in Yerevan’s diplomatic maneuvering in its interactions with Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan has repeatedly affirmed its readiness to sign a peace agreement with Armenia. At the same time, Azerbaijani officials have stressed the need for two interconnected conditions to be met: the formal dissolution of the defunct OSCE Minsk Group and the removal of territorial claims against Azerbaijan embedded in the Armenian Constitution.
The OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, the United States, and Russia, failed over decades to deliver an effective or legally grounded resolution to the conflict. Throughout its existence, the Group produced no analytical documents reflecting an objective understanding of the situation, nor did it present a unified and impartial legal assessment. Moreover, it offered no meaningful solutions consistent with international law — which, notably, has always supported Azerbaijan’s position. Consequently, Baku considers the format not only outdated but fundamentally illegitimate and calls for its official termination.
Yerevan’s recent willingness to endorse the dissolution of the Minsk Group, while avoiding constitutional reforms, appears to be a tactical concession aimed at preserving the status quo. By conceding on an institution already stripped of influence, the Armenian leadership seeks to portray flexibility while delaying the more critical issue — constitutional amendments.
Azerbaijan maintains a pragmatic and principled stance: a comprehensive peace agreement is only possible if all legal and political obstacles are removed. As Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, “Following the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group and the elimination of territorial claims, no obstacles will remain for signing a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia and restoring interstate relations.”
In other words, dismantling the Minsk Group is a necessary but insufficient condition. As long as Armenia’s Constitution contains provisions that imply territorial claims against Azerbaijan, Baku considers the signing of a peace agreement legally impossible.
Despite continued statements from Armenian officials regarding their readiness to normalize relations — including Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan’s remarks about a “de facto” end to the conflict and a search for a date and venue for the peace treaty — there is a stark contrast between rhetoric and substantive action. Declaring the conflict resolved while preserving constitutional contradictions appears premature and disingenuous.
It is important to note that the international community, despite its often cautious rhetoric, recognizes the logic of Azerbaijan’s position. For over three decades, Armenia faced little to no political, economic, or moral pressure for its occupation of Azerbaijani territories. Only after Azerbaijan restored its sovereignty over its internationally recognized lands did some Western actors begin criticizing Baku — the same actors who had long ignored Armenia’s expansionist policies.
Given Azerbaijan’s consistent adherence to international law, efforts to pressure or isolate Baku lack traction. Azerbaijan insists on legal guarantees and the fulfillment of previously agreed commitments, including the reopening of regional transport and communication routes — an obligation clearly outlined in the trilateral statement of November 10, 2020.
Rushing into a peace agreement without addressing these fundamental legal inconsistencies could lead to future disputes and destabilization. Therefore, addressing the constitutional claims is not a peripheral issue — it is a central requirement for establishing a stable and legally sound peace framework in the South Caucasus.
