After the end of the Second Karabakh War, the balance of power in the South Caucasus region underwent significant changes. This shift influenced the involvement of external players and particularly drew attention to Türkiye’s strategy in the region. At the center of this focus is the trilateral cooperation format between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which plays a key role in Türkiye’s regional policy. While Ankara has been developing similar multilateral partnerships in other regions, including Central Asia, its alliance with Azerbaijan and Georgia stands out due to its high level of representation and broad scope of cooperation.
The foundations of this partnership were laid in the 1990s and saw further development in the 2000s. Initially, priority was given to economic projects in the fields of energy and logistics, which provided economic benefits to all participants. However, over time, cooperation extended beyond economic matters and began to include security issues, significantly enhancing Türkiye’s role in the South Caucasus.
Energy and Transportation
For Türkiye, the partnership with Azerbaijan and Georgia holds strategic importance, as it strengthens its position as a transit hub between Europe and Asia. Key projects include oil and gas pipelines as well as transportation corridors such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, and the Southern Gas Corridor, which consists of several main pipelines.
Azerbaijan, possessing significant oil and gas reserves, plays a critical role in supplying energy to Türkiye and Georgia. In turn, Georgia serves as a transit corridor, ensuring the export of energy resources to international markets. This infrastructure enables the participating countries to reduce their dependence on traditional routes by creating alternative transportation pathways, including the promising Zangezur Corridor.
However, at present, Azerbaijani gas supplies do not significantly impact Russia’s share in the energy markets of Türkiye and Europe. Nevertheless, in the long term, expanding pipeline capacity and integrating new suppliers such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan could lead to a significant reduction in Europe’s dependence on Russian resources.
Following the events of 2020 and increasing sanctions pressure, Türkiye has been promoting initiatives for alternative transportation routes, such as the Zangezur Corridor and the Middle Corridor. These projects aim to reduce Russia’s and China’s influence in logistics, benefiting Türkiye and Azerbaijan and making their partnership even more significant. Strengthening the connectivity of these routes solidifies Türkiye’s position as a leading transport hub between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe.
Security Issues
Türkiye is actively expanding its military presence in the region and seeks to play a key role in maintaining stability. Although initially, military cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia was limited to the protection of infrastructure projects, since the mid-2000s, it has become more structured. Türkiye provides military support, conducts personnel training, supplies weapons, and regularly organizes joint exercises. For example, the Eternity-2024 maneuvers held in Georgia demonstrate the increasing level of coordination among these countries.
Since 2014, trilateral meetings of defense ministers have become regular, strengthening the military-political component of the partnership. However, cooperation is not uniform: Türkiye has deeper military ties with Azerbaijan than with Georgia, where the focus remains primarily on economic collaboration.
Despite the increase in arms exports, Türkiye still cannot compete with Russia in terms of arms supply to the region. Between 2015 and 2019, Russian weapons accounted for 31% of Azerbaijan’s imports, while Turkish arms made up only 3.2%. Georgia, on the other hand, is not a major buyer of Turkish weapons, and recent years have seen only limited deliveries.
The signing of the Shusha Declaration in 2021 strengthened the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance, fostering military integration between the two countries. However, the establishment of a permanent Turkish military base in Azerbaijan in the near future is unlikely, as Baku does not yet see the necessity for it. Additionally, due to Georgia’s limited interest in a military alliance, the trilateral format remains primarily economic rather than defense-oriented.
Limitations of the Partnership
Despite the active development of trilateral cooperation, certain limitations remain. First, Türkiye’s relationship with Azerbaijan is much deeper than with Georgia, where interactions are mostly focused on economic matters. Second, the trilateral format still lags behind bilateral relations between individual countries. Third, Georgia remains dependent on both Turkey and Azerbaijan, which limits its autonomy in decision-making.
Another factor restraining Türkiye’s ambitions is its internal economic instability. In 2022, inflation reached record levels, negatively affecting Ankara’s investment potential. Moreover, new players such as China and India are increasing their presence in the region, while traditional external powers—including Russia, Iran, and the United States—continue to exert influence over processes in the South Caucasus.
Thus, the Türkiye–Azerbaijan–Georgia format remains a crucial element of regional policy but faces a number of challenges. In the coming years, its development will depend on the balance of interests among the involved parties, geopolitical dynamics, and economic realities.
