The geopolitics of the South Caucasus remains one of the most sensitive and volatile in the Eurasian space. In recent months, the Republic of Armenia has demonstrated a noticeable adjustment in its foreign policy course, as reflected in the directive by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to restore interagency cooperation with the Russian Federation and to intensify participation in joint initiatives. These actions have become a subject of discussion both within Armenia and among key foreign policy partners. The Russian side, in particular presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov, welcomed this rapprochement. He emphasized that, despite a period of strained relations, contacts between the two countries had not been severed and are grounded in deep cultural, historical, and integrative ties, including participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
The perception of this step by Yerevan as a “return” clearly indicates a prior phase of substantial distancing. Armenia’s foreign policy orientation toward the West—primarily the United States—was previously accompanied by sharp rhetoric against Russia, as well as criticism of the CSTO’s performance. In October 2023, Armenia signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership with the United States, a largely declarative document formalized in the final phase of Joe Biden’s presidency. In the context of increasing global uncertainty, especially with Donald Trump’s return to the political stage and his willingness to engage in dialogue with the Russian Federation, the relevance of this document for Yerevan has significantly diminished.
Another indicator of Armenia’s shifting foreign policy agenda is the decision to postpone the second reading of a bill on launching the process of EU accession by two months. The draft law, which passed its first reading, was initially scheduled for parliamentary review on March 25, 2025. The Armenian government’s official justification cited the “complex geopolitical context.” Indirectly, this decision appears tied both to internal political risks—including the sharp decline in the prime minister’s approval ratings (as shown by a Gallup International poll, public disapproval rose from 41.5% in October 2024 to 65% in March 2025)—and to growing uncertainty within the European Union itself.
It is important to note that pursuing a Eurocentric course without regard to regional realities entails the risk of Armenia losing its EAEU membership, which would bring significant economic losses. Russia remains Armenia’s main external economic partner, accounting for approximately 80% of Armenian exports. In addition, the volume of accumulated Russian investment in the Armenian economy exceeds $4 billion. Losing access to the unified Eurasian market could have long-term negative consequences, particularly considering Armenia’s high dependence on Russian energy, trade, and financial flows. Prime Minister Pashinyan’s attempt to challenge the value of EAEU membership by demanding proof of its benefits was met with a restrained but unequivocal response from Moscow.
In addition to economic factors, the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan plays a critical role in the reassessment of Armenia’s foreign policy priorities. Despite official statements from Yerevan, incidents of ceasefire violations are regularly recorded and present a real risk of escalation. At the same time, Armenia’s strategic ambiguity toward the CSTO—which it has temporarily suspended participation in—substantially undermines its defensive capacity. In the event of a military escalation, the prospect of Russian military support becomes a critical factor, especially given Armenia’s limited defense resources.
Alongside the gradual normalization of Armenian-Russian relations, a new U.S. initiative has emerged in the information sphere involving the transfer of military equipment from a base in Germany to Armenia’s Zar training ground. According to a tender published on the U.S. government procurement portal, the transportation of 151 pieces of equipment—including vehicles, generators, and specialized containers—is planned. These actions have raised concerns within expert circles, as they are taking place on territory hosting Russian military bases. Moreover, the United States explicitly ruled out transit through Russia, Turkey, or Azerbaijan, which points to diplomatic complexities and a lack of full transparency. According to Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Yerevan has not received an official request from Washington regarding the deployment, thereby further increasing uncertainty about the true scope and purpose of the project.
Meanwhile, bilateral diplomatic activity between Armenia and Russia is gaining momentum. In Moscow, a meeting took place between the deputy foreign ministers of the two countries—Mikhail Galuzin and Mnatsakan Safaryan—during which a detailed exchange of views was held on political, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. Particular attention was given to regional collaboration within the framework of the “3+3 Platform,” which includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. In the economic sphere, Russian Minister Maksim Reshetnikov met with Armenian Minister of Economy Gevorg Papoyan to discuss four planned research projects aimed at enhancing bilateral cooperation and developing Armenia’s economy within the EAEU.
The totality of these developments suggests an attempt by Yerevan to adjust its foreign policy trajectory in light of the changing international environment. However, this strategy remains largely reactive and lacks a clear long-term vision. As Armenia oscillates between different centers of power, its perceived reliability as a partner inevitably declines. Historical experience shows that small and dependent states such as Armenia cannot afford foreign policy eclecticism without risking becoming objects of geopolitical pressure from more powerful actors. Strategic geopolitical balancing requires consistency; otherwise, it devolves into chaotic maneuvering, which renders the state vulnerable and ineffective in times of external crisis.
In conclusion, Yerevan’s current foreign policy reflects both internal fragmentation and external uncertainty. This is well understood not only in Moscow but also in Baku, Ankara, Tehran, Brussels, and Washington, where relations with Armenia are being shaped either by cautious pragmatism or by coercive leverage. Until Armenia stabilizes its foreign policy orientation, its strategic position will continue to be defined by the logic of “whichever way you turn, there’s a dead end.”
